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Appendix 1 
Interpreting intersubjectivity and Husserl 
Aim: The point of Appendices is to add material that is necessary but is not of the 
utmost importance so as to place it in the main body. The Appendices position the 
thesis and appraise some of the relevant literature. Unfortunately, due to the very 
intricate topics that surround the work of Freud and Husserl, there is a very great deal 
that could be written at this late stage and not everything can be discussed but still 
some comments are necessary. It does not help to bore the reader and add material that 
does not argue. This Appendix provides an account of the supporting literature in 
phenomenology and psychotherapy. To achieve the interpretation of this thesis, it has 
been necessary to explore a number of themes that are not recognised as being central 
within the English language secondary literature. Some readings need to be affirmed as 
being close to the text whilst others need denounced because of their inaccuracy with 
respect to the pertinent issues. There are many writers who would claim to be 
phenomenological. But once Husserl and Heidegger are understood (Moran, 2000a), it 
is possible to identify key themes that define this area. There are no other doctoral 
theses on Freud and Husserl in Dissertation Abstracts International. The specific 
reading made in this work owes a debt to the expositions of Fink (1933/1970, 
1934/1972,1939/1981), Sokolowski (1964,1968,1981), Kem (1977,1988), Biemel 
(1970,1977), Embree (1996) and the work of Marbach and Ströker, listed in the 
references. The thesis contends that Husserl's work on the intentionality of 
consciousness has never been fully presented despite the agreeable contributions made by 
Marbach such as Mental Representation and Consciousness (1993), which is argued as 
the leading idealist reading of Husserl. There is a genre of Freud studies and this work is 
a critical and appreciative contribution that sees deep positive worth in free association 
and free floating attention, yet it is important to think how meaning exists. Specific 
works consulted on transference include Carotenuto (1991) and Prokoris (1995) and 
6 
Gardner on the interrelation of thought and emotion by the unconscious (1993). 
1.1 Interpretative problems 
There are numerous interpretative problems for the thesis and its allied areas. 
Commentary is required concerning how they are treated. There is no consensus 
concerning Husserl and Freud, nor are there agreed accounts of relations between Kant, 
Husserl and Heidegger or scholarship concerning Freud, psychodynamics or therapy. 
Consequently, the interpretative problems in Husserl studies and therapy are addressed 
in the following ways. 
Firstly, a dilemma appears because when I think of the field of relevant 
literature I have read in compiling this thesis, mostly it appears incoherent. Generally, 
strongly felt, negative comments are not expressed in academic work. Such comments 
would win no new friends and do not serve the purpose of scholarly work. Therefore, 
the comments expressed below are with respect to the content of the work, not its 
author. The imperative is to create an independent critical position and make argument, 
where some stance is championed and others challenged. Some comments are made in 
positioning Freud and Husserl to other writers. Freud and Husserl are claimed to be 
central to the topic of interpreting mental processes. 
In overview, there are five `axes' or `directions' within philosophy, 
psychotherapy and psychology that need to be related to Freud and Husserl. `Axis one' 
is to understand the relation of Husserl to his phenomenological philosophy peers of 
Scheler, the early Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. Axis one comprises the core 
phenomenological writers. This group would also include Sartre to some extent. It is 
obvious that Husserl had an oblique and elliptical style of writing. Half a sentence can 
be very significant when understood in the proper context. He also employed irony and 
rhetorical devices, so that what might appear to be stated directly on one page was 
actually overturned on the next. To further complicate matters, he could use the same 
term on the same page in two entirely different senses. Therefore, Husserl's terms can 
only be defined by great care and attention to the small details of the work. Reading 
Husserl is similar to practising phenomenology. Both require an attention to the letter 
and spirit of the text, in order to find invariant aspects and interrelations between 
aspects of the whole. Close reading is--a version of reflecting on a textual object and 
requires thinking and reconsidering the text and the experiences to which it points. 
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Logical Investigations, Ideas I, Formal and Transcendental Logic and Cartesian 
Meditations were the only books over which Husserl had full editorial control and 
these do not present the full set of essences of Husserlian phenomenology (Embree, 
1993, p xiii). Overall, it is decided that Sartre cannot be included in this grouping 
because he shared too much in common with the broader contingent of continental 
philosophers. 
A second axis would compare Freud to phenomenological therapies of the sort 
initiated by Boss, Atwood and Stolorow. Lacan could also be placed in this grouping 
because he was influenced by Merleau-Ponty on the importance of language. But he 
did not follow phenomenology despite having been influenced by Heidegger. Lacan is 
noteworthy for his "schema L" which could be read as bearing a parallel to the work of 
Husserl. But it is enormously difficult to get sense out of his writing after about the 
year 1953. 
A third axis moves from Husserl's influence as it has been adopted by 
American `phenomenological' psychology that is argued to be a mistaken rush 
headlong into non-a-priori experimentalism entirely against the instructions of the 
phenomenological philosophers. This is dubbed pseudo-phenomenology and briefly 
mentioned in Appendix 3.4. 
A fourth axis of interpretative problems lies in the direction towards 
hermeneutics. This path includes the contributions of Ricoeur, Derrida and Gadamer, 
for instance. The latter is important as it is the stance of the thesis. Received wisdom 
says that Heidegger is relevant for the purposes of psychology and therapy. The thesis 
disagrees because Heidegger's stance is not intentional (nor meta-representational). 
But it should follow the hermeneutic circle. This is why Husserl is more relevant when 
the connection to hermeneutics is made. 
There is a fifth axis towards ethics and the work of Levinas (1986,1987, Gans, 
1997). (Assoun (1998) is one who has written on Lacan and Levinas but it is not 
possible to discuss his paper because it contributes nothing relevant). 
There could be a more philosophical approach that would follow the trends 
from the Ancients, through Descartes to Kant, and towards the developments by Hegel, 
Nietzsche, Kierkegaarde, Sartre, and Foucault 
- 
or towards Levinas and Buber. The 
philosophy of science and the relation towards natural science could also be explored 
in more detail but it is not. It would be-possible to take phenomenology to make broad 
comments on psychology and therapy and not just psychoanalysis. Comments 
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specifically on the Fifth Cartesian Meditation are placed in Appendix 2. However, 
because of the need to make a focus, the main exploration occurs in a critique of Freud 
from the position of Husserl, in order to better understand the relation between 
Heidegger and Boss with respect to the phenomena of others, meaning and 
intersubjectivity. All other considerations are set aside. All of these axes entail major 
interpretative problems. In summing up so far, it can be seen that the literature is 
diverse and much comment on the Fifth Meditation has been misguided. Detailed 
discussions follow below. 
First, let us consider the axis of phenomenological and continental philosophy. 
There is an outstanding lack of consensus in Husserl scholarship. Several of the 
important concepts in Husserl's writings are interrelated and defined contextually in an 
abstract terminology. Rare are the passages where clear examples of the method and its 
results are stated. Occasionally, concrete passages supply examples of what Husserl 
exhorted his readers to achieve. For instance, there are only a few pages on what it 
means to vary an essence of a visual object-sense (Id II, §18b, p 67/62). There is little 
or no consensus among Husserl scholars on the stance, central concepts and full 
practice of phenomenology. Even Directors of the Husserl Archives emphasise 
different aspects of the noemal. Among English language publications by philosophers 
who are familiar with the German language texts, there is little or no agreement on 
Husserl's methodology. Indeed, Husserl defined his approach as a method to be 
practised and that others might come to replicate what he had experienced and 
concluded on: 
If the right attitude has been won, and made secure by practice... if one 
has acquired the courage to obey the clear eidetic data with a radical 
lack of prejudice so as to be unencumbered by all current and learned 
theories, then firm results are directly produced, and the same thing 
occurs for everyone having the same attitude; there accrue firm 
possibilities of communicating to others what one has himself seen, of 
'Bernet has it that the noema is an object of belief (BKM, p 50, p 176) and Kern writes 
that it can be used in a very general sense (pp 95-101). Marbach writes that the noema is real (1982, p 223, fn). Ströker writes that only the transcendental approach entails 
the noema and that it has no connection to the natural attitude (1987, pp 57-60). In 1993 she wrote that many noematic moments comprise a noema of identity, despite differences that appear (p 100). 
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testing descriptions, of making salient the unnoticed intrusions of empty 
verbal meanings, of making known and weeding out error by measuring 
them again against intuition 
- 
errors which are also possible here just as 
in any sphere of validity. 
Id I, §87, p 212/180. 
Part of what Husserl claimed in the above is that elucidations arise from the 
phenomena themselves, considered as conditions of imagined possibility, essence, in 
both pure psychology or the transcendental contemplation of conditions for any world: 
a modal logic. What Husserl claimed above is that this elucidation is not logical 
imposition or argument, but a direct revelation gained from appreciating the 
similarities and differences in what appears. It would be possible to write a good deal 
about the close relation between Kant and Husserl and interesting to compare Kant and 
Freud and Kant and Heidegger. To do these things well would require a great deal of 
space. The proximity between an idealist reading of the Critique of Pure Reason 
(version A) and an idealist reading of Husserl is juxtaposed with a possible 
hermeneutics of lived experience. Since the publication of Gardner's Kant and the 
Critique of Pure Reason, (1999), there is a text that makes plain a reading of Kant. 
These works support the reasoning of the thesis and sit well with Marbach's Mental 
Representation and Consciousness (1993). Husserl's The Idea of Phenomenology, 
some sections of Ideas I and Ideas II and the Fifth Cartesian Meditation, are texts that 
make the consideration of the conditions of possibility for intentionality to reach the 
transcendent world, most clear. Once this is understood, it becomes clear that Husserl 
is the intellectual heir of Kant. Husserl did not duck the problem of intentionality nor 
turn to an analytic reading of Kant, as did Heidegger in his turn to Being without 
intentionality or co-intentionality. Specifically, most of Husserl's philosophy is a reply 
to Kant by radicalising the Copernican turn to epistemology and transcendental 
philosophy concerning an ideal sociality of intersubjective consciousness (Id III, Supp 
I, §5, p 116/128). But it is argued that Husserl is not entirely without hermeneutics and 
early claims about presuppositionlessness amount to nothing. (Work by Meinong 
(1972) and Hander (1967) have been read as alternative approaches to phenomenology 
and a means of further understanding the whole). 
The second axis of phenomenological developments of Freud includes the 
contributions of Boss, Atwood and Stolorow, and could make reference to Lacan 
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(Appendix 3.3 for details). There are a number of interpretative problems in assessing 
the current conceptual basis of therapy. 
In the third axis of phenomenological therapy and psychology, is an alleged 
corruption of phenomenology. The work of Wertz and Giorgio is singled out as being 
faulty in Appendix 3.4. (Axis four, towards hermeneutics, and the fifth axis towards 
ethics are omitted from detailed inquiry. It would have been possible to explore 
criticisms of psychopathology and psychiatry but this was not pertinent either (Grob, 
1991, Gaines, 1992, Parker et al, 1995)). There was no point in providing analyses the 
literatures on empathy in therapy and child development, as this would merely show 
how non-phenomenological they are. Therefore, no use has been made of Berger 
(1987), Guy on the trails and tribulations of practice (1987), nor Marris (1996) who has 
done much to relate attachment and child rearing to economics, in a neo-Marxian way. 
The answer to interpretative difficulties is to employ the hermeneutics of 
Rickman (1997,1998) who is accepted because he is a senior figure in the UK who has 
pioneered hermeneutics for over three decades. He holds that there are such things as 
identifiable criteria for a better or worse interpretations of an author's work. He 
maintains that such criteria are rationally identifiable. "Interpretation is not a guessing 
game. There is something to be interpreted that also limits the range of reasonable 
interpretations. Even if final, incontrovertible interpretations elude us we need to look 
constantly for better interpretations and, therefore, for criteria to judge their 
superiority", (Ibid, p 302). Obeying the hermeneutic circle means reiteratively 
recontextualising the part and the whole. The part informs the whole and the whole 
informs the part. Because of Norris (2000), it is decided to give Derrida (1973,1974a, 
1974b, 1978,1991) the benefit of the doubt despite his failure to attend to the genuine 
details of what Husserl was trying to do as seen in Formal and Transcendental Logic, 
Cartesian Meditations and The Crisis. Palmer has provided extra tips on hermeneutics 
(1969). A similar introduction by Phillips (1996) and Maddox (1983). 
The thesis is not against empirical research but shows how a priori reasoning is 
potentially useful in deciding between theoretical positions. The manners of drawing 
conclusions, justifying guiding concepts and inferring clinical reasoning are important. 
It is an a priori hermeneutic and epistemological concern. Psychological reasoning is a 
fundamental activity for clients and therapists. This thesis begins thinking about the 
other, and relating with them, in an overall context of understanding psychological 
meaningfulness. 
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1.2 Existential phenomenology and the other 
The writings of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty need some detailed discussion, as these two 
thinkers have been some of the most influential in existentialism or existential 
phenomenology. It is asserted that a central difference between Husserl, Binswanger, 
Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and Boss is the acceptance or rejection of Kant's 
transcendental philosophical approach of considering the conditions of possibility. 
Despite their differences, Husserl, Binswanger and Heidegger focused on ascertaining 
the conditions of possibility for concepts, by finding universal and necessary a priori, 
through a rational analysis of how Objectivity appears and makes sense in various 
contexts. The classifications of existential phenomenology, transcendental 
phenomenology and ontological-hermeneutic a priori phenomenology are difficult and 
would take the thesis too far afield from its task of appraising the understanding of 
intersubjectivity as Husserl defined it. The stance of existential phenomenology, or 
existentialism, is held by this thesis to be the commonalities between Sartre and 
Merleau-Ponty in their work during the 1940s where they reinterpreted Husserl and 
Heidegger (Owen, 2004). Briefly, existential phenomenology did not make an a priori 
analysis and neither does the work of Boss, which, although heavily influenced by 
Heidegger, omitted all mention of the consideration of conditions of possibility in Boss 
and Heidegger's two most influential works. It is argued that Husserl's attention to 
empathy, and co-intentionality with respect to being, is more relevant than the 
approach of Heidegger and Boss in the English language translations. It is judged that 
where Husserl fails is the omission of hermeneutics and this is not acceptable for the 
thesis. 
Heidegger's Letter on Humanism of 1947 makes it clear that Sartre is incorrect 
in claiming that existence precedes essence, which has the sense that actuality precedes 
possibility. "But the basic tenet of "existentialism" has nothing at all in common with 
the statement from Being and Time 
- 
apart from the fact that in Being and Time no 
statement about the relation of essentia and existentia can yet be expressed, since there 
is still a question of preparing something precursory", (1993, p 232). Heidegger 
distances himself from Sartre's "humanism" because it still does "not realize the 
proper dignity of man. To that extent the thinking in Being and Time is against 
humanism", (p 233). 
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The writing of Sartre in Being and Nothingness is without details and 
references. Because he indiscriminately commented on Descartes, Kant, Hegel, 
Husserl, Freud, Heidegger and others, the reader has to know the work of these writers 
in order to understand what is being stated. Accordingly, it becomes possible to 
mistake when Sartre is voicing his own beliefs, criticising others, agreeing with a point 
and so forth. Two things are clear. First, Sartre refuted some of the beliefs of the 
Kantians because they were "preoccupied with establishing the universal laws of 
subjectivity which are the same for all, [and] never dealt with the question of persons", 
(1958, p 225). Second, Being and Nothingness is not an acceptable critique or 
development concerning the Cartesian Meditations because Sartre failed to understand 
some of the basic points of Husserl's stance. So Sartre criticised beliefs that Husserl 
never held. The comments on the other as self-reifying and self-deceiving can be 
gleaned from the account of the young girl and the waiter (pp 50-64) and the 
culmination of the existential psychoanalysis (pp 557-616) that reaches a peak in trying 
to understand humanity as a "totality", (pp 567-9). 
Yet there are some novel elements to Being and Nothingness and these are 
similar in spirit to the hermeneutic difficulties mentioned by Jaspers. For instance, 
intersubjectivity cannot provide "universal knowledge" because of the "ontological 
separation" between self and other. For Sartre, any two persons are free to act and do 
not influence each other, nor bear any relation to the other in any way of being able to 
control, stand against or for, or in other ways communicate or share meaning: 
"between the Other-as-object and Me-as-subject there is no common measure, no more 
than between self-consciousness and consciousness of the Other... No universal 
knowledge can be derived from the relation of consciousnesses. This is what we call 
ontological separation", (p 243). The other is other. Their perspective is never given to 
me as it is to them. 
For Sartre, for-itself inanimate being cannot have intentional relations. (It 
cannot be open to the world in Heidegger's terms). "The Other is first the permanent 
flight of things toward a goal which I apprehend as an object at a certain distance from 
me but which escapes me inasmuch as it unfolds about itself its own distances", (p 
255). In making these comments, he was arguing that the other `takes' the self `outside 
itself. The other de-centres the self and takes it towards that which is not. Sartre made 
three initial basic claims: "- 
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[1] The realist who believes that he apprehends the Other through his 
body considers therefore that he is separated from the Other as one body 
from another body, which means that the ontological meaning of the 
negation contained in the judgement, "I am not Paul, " is of the same 
type as that of the negation contained in the judgement, "the table is not 
the chair"... [2] The knowing subject can neither limit another subject 
nor cause itself to be limited by another subject... [3] Only a witness 
external both to myself and to the Other could compare the image with 
the model and decide whether it is a true one. 
p 231. 
Let us take these points one at a time. Firstly, to understand the other through their 
body is classed as a realist position and that ordinary logic applies. This was not the 
case for Husserl. Secondly, freedom and the inability to constrain human being are 
assumed. This is clearly not the case from the cases of slavery, inculcating fear, 
manipulation and the sexual abuse of children. Thirdly, Sartre precluded the possibility 
that it is possible to adopt a new perspective or the perspective of another. Again, this 
is clearly untrue. If clients could not grasp their freedom to understand and act 
differently, there would be no possibility of maturing or therapy. 
The hermeneutic of the sense of the other in Sartre begins with the idea that a 
human totality or world never appears (p 225). He has a point here in that the human 
totality is a difficult set of positions to grasp and that the human sciences are based on 
subtle evidence. Sartre also agreed with Heidegger: Arguments concerning empathy 
"do not put the debate on its true ground: that is the Other is first perceived or he 
appears in experience as a particular form before all habitude; and in the absence of 
any analogous inference the fact remains that the object, signifying and perceived, the 
expressive form refer purely and simply to a human totality whose existence remains 
purely and simply conjectural", (p 225). Sartre did not like inquiry into the conditions 
of possibility. 
For Sartre, the ether frustrates and defeats the desire to know: "I apprehend the 
relation of the green to the Other as an objective relation, but I can not apprehend the 
green as it appears to the Other. Thus suddenly an object has appeared which has 
stolen the world from me... the Other in the world corresponds 
... 
to a decentralization 
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of the world which undermines the centralization which I am simultaneously 
effecting", (p 255). The otherness of any specific other person is a whole, a gestalt: My 
"apprehension of a look turned toward me appears on the ground of the destruction of 
the eyes which "look at me". If I apprehend the look, I cease to perceive the eyes", (p 
258). In conclusion, Sartre keeps readers guessing what he was arguing for and against. 
The writing of Merleau-Ponty lacks references but replied in more detail to 
Husserl and Heidegger mainly, and the reader has to know their work in order to 
understand if he is agreeing or disagreeing, recapping or developing. Generally, the 
writing style is less bombastic and more to the point than Sartre. Although 
introductory, the comments are often more accurate. The general tendency to think that 
Merleau-Ponty is a better phenomenologist than Husserl is created by the fact that 
Merleau-Ponty is a better writer who recapped portions of Ideas II, Cartesian 
Meditations, Crisis and Being and Time in a relevant and accessible way. But two 
points need to be observed. First, Merleau-Ponty refuted Kant because the criticisms of 
intellectualism and "objective thought" that he deemed unacceptable for an attention to 
being in the world, the being of others and consciousness. Second, Phenomenology of 
Perception (1962, pp 348-364) is in broad agreement with the Fifth Cartesian 
Meditation and accepts hermeneutic openness or re-interpretability. As shown below, 
Merleau-Ponty differed in the view of the other with respect to Sartre. 
The place to start with Merleau-Ponty is his treatment of meaning as a self- 
sufficient whole, which follows on from Ideas I, section 49, where Husserl argued that 
meaning and being exist for consciousness as cognised being. The starting place is to 
attend to the manifold of ways in which consciousness intends the world and being 
with other consciousness. Merleau-Ponty quite rightly asserted that "it is clear that no 
causal relationship is conceivable between the subject and his body, his world or his 
society", (1962, p 434): in the sense of there being natural cause-proper occurring 
within the sphere of meaning. He correctly recognised that `causal, ' motivational, 
associations of sense occur. Merleau-Ponty agreed with Kant and Husserl that 
considering the world is an absolute perspective: "the whole universe of science is built 
upon the world as directly experienced", (p viii). "To return to the things themselves is 
to return to that world which precedes knowledge, of which knowledge always speaks, 
and in relation to which every scientific schematization is an abstract and derivative 
sign-language, as is geography to the country-side", (p ix): Meaning that one should 
not mistake the map for the territory 
- 
or a moment (language) for the whole of senses 
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that it can be about. 
Merleau-Ponty believed that phenomenology involves indeterminacy and 
openness of perspective. As a consequence, descriptions potentially defy rational 
thought and are connected to ambiguity: "Thus there is in human existence a principle 
of indeterminacy... Existence is indeterminate in itself, by reason of its fundamental 
structure, and in so far as it is the very process whereby the hitherto meaningless takes 
on meaning... chance is transformed into reason", (p 169). But if we agree with Kant 
that description without argument is not philosophy. The philosophy begins with 
transcendentalism. 
There is a treatment of the hermeneutic problem concerning how to catch 
experience before egoic reflection can turn to it. It concerns how human experience can 
be caught in a pristine way. This possibility is investigated in "finding out how to steal 
a march on myself and experience the unreflective as such", (p 360). Merleau-Ponty 
showed his scholarship in understanding the close relation of perception, bodiliness 
and temporality 
- 
as portrayed in Ideas II and Cartesian Meditations. Consequently, he 
explained Husserl's position by stating that the human body is a third type of being, 
neither wholly natural nor of-consciousness. The "body withdraws from the objective 
world, and forms between the pure subject and the object a third genus of being... ", (p 
350). Human bodiliness is lived and material. Leib-Körper is a part of a new whole, an 
intercorporeal one, just as in Ideas II and Cartesian Meditations: "Henceforth, as the 
parts of my body together compr[om]ise a system, so my body and the other's are one 
whole, two sides of one and the same phenomenon, and the anonymous existence of 
which my body is the ever-renewed trace henceforth inhabits both bodies 
simultaneously. All of which makes another living being, but not yet another man", 
(1962, p 354). The word "comprise" makes better sense in the last excerpt although 
"compromise" is what appears in the book. Therefore, "compromise" must be a 
typesetting or translation error. 
For instance, an interesting part of the stance of Merleau-Ponty for this thesis is 
to agree that, to a great extent, the region of meaning for consciousness is governed by 
association of meaning, which is the nature of `cause' or motivation of sense between 
people 
- 
and that such a region does contain within it ambiguity and a multiplicity of 
perspectives on the self same (1964, p 169). Meaning is co-extensive with culture and 
history. To a degree, all understandings-for Husserl are historical ones (BKM, p 265). 
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Besides the tendencies which proceed from other individual persons, 
there are demands which arise in the intentional form of indeterminate 
generality, the demands of morality, of custom, of tradition, of the 
spiritual milieu: "one" judges this way, "one" has to hold his fork like 
this, and so on 
- 
i. e., demands of the social group, of the class, etc. They 
can be followed quite passively, or one can also actively take a position 
with regard to them and make a free decision in favor of them. 
Id II, §60c, p 281-2/269. 
It is a weakness of phenomenology that Husserl did not go further into the details of 
specific psychological analyses of tradition, affect, child development, context, history, 
class and culture. This shortfall is set right by Chapter 12 in a preliminary way. 
Finally, as concerns the other in relation to self, to be embodied is not a form of 
intellectual knowledge but a mode of fundamental existence: "Our bodily experience 
of movement is not a particular case of knowledge... My body has its world, or 
understands its world, without having to make use of my `symbolic' or `objectifying 
function"', (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, pp 140-1). "Solipsism would be strictly true only of 
someone who managed to be tacitly aware of his existence without being or doing 
anything, which is impossible, since existing is being and doing in the world", (p 361). 
Human beings cannot escape one another. Meaning is social and historical. The region 
of meaning and being for consciousness is governed by association of meaning, which 
is the nature of `cause' or motivation of sense between people 
- 
and that such a region 
does contain ambiguity and a multiplicity of perspectives on the same object. 
1.3 British continental philosophy's mis-understanding of phenomenology 
The following roll call of writers are claimed to have done harm to Husserl studies by 
spreading misinformation. Alweiss (2003) is challenged for being unclear and 
unjustified in the World Unclaimed. She is right that bodiliness is one way in which 
Husserl surpassed Heidegger in Being and Time. A. Smith (2003) is off target in his 
book on the Cartesian Meditations, but that will be dealt with in Appendix 2. Finally 
the comments of Mays are an example-of authoritative statements on Husserl that are 
not shared in this work. 
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Mays in an interview expressed as series of wrong claims and it is because of 
his seniority that time is spent challenging his views. Mays said that "Husserl took 
over Brentano's concept of intentionality", (Mays and Hamrick, 2001, p 24). The most 
charitable reading of this remark is that it could be approximately correct if he meant 
that Husserl developed Brentano's work a great deal. But as it stands, it is untrue. 
Husserl criticised Brentano's concept of intentionality from 1905 (Time, §§3-6). By 
1913 Husserl had developed phenomenology a great deal in attempting to work out 
how mental processes are involuted 
- 
in his concept of "intentional explication, " or 
sometimes "implication, " (which is a play of logical implication) but these remarks are 
brief and can be misunderstood (Id I, §§105,114,117). Closely connected to 
"intentional modification" is the belief that all forms of conceptual intentionality and 
presentiation are referred back to original experiences of fulfilled perception. 
When Mays stated that Heidegger's concept of Mitsein succeeds "in a way that 
Husserl's notion of empathy did not", (Mays and Hamrick, 2001, p 25), he made a 
contentious remark that is not justified for either transcendental or psychological 
phenomenology. It is not justified because within the transcendental phenomenological 
perspective, Husserl made it clear how the process of empathic presentiation 
constitutes at once, a mutual interrelation between self, other, cultural object and 
meaningful world. In a pure psychological perspective, Husserl did account for the 
possibility of actual affect, and ease of understanding of specific other persons, on the 
basis of empathic presentiation. 
The next bone of contention is that it was Husserl in 1919 who gave a lecture 
on the understanding of a hammer as a cultural object, a meaningful object in the 
world. There is no mention by Mays of Heidegger who borrowed a copy of Ideas 1I for 
six years between 1925 and 1931 and who obviously took heavily from its ideas on 
pre-reflective presence and contextuality, a debt which Mays does not explain. 
Temporality is most fundamental for Husserl, as anyone who has read Ideas I, 
The Idea of Phenomenology and Time will know. Heidegger broke Husserl's copyright 
in his writing on temporality in Being and Time. 
Furthermore, all remarks by Husserl about his method being "descriptive" are 
misleading. Husserl misrepresented his own stance with introductory remarks harking 
back to Brentano's position that Husserl had surpassed. The imaginative variation of 
essences was at work from at least 1907 and Husserl had worked with variation in 
mathematics since 1890. It is incorrect to state that intentionality is a "conscious 
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attitude", (Mays and Hamrick, 2001, p 25). A conscious attitude is only one type of 
intentionality. This is wrong. 
With respect to the remainder of the interview, the thesis agrees that the natural 
science, which Husserl criticised, has evolved. Since the advent of quantum physics, 
finite element analysis and the digital computer, the nineteenth century natural science 
mould has been broken and science has been challenged by the strange material 
phenomena is it has interpreted. Therefore, to state that: "One ought 
... 
not hold a 
priori views which conflict with such findings", (p 28), is to disrupt philosophy's 
domain of rational thought that prepares for contact with the real. Given that Husserl's 
and Heidegger's positions are greatly influenced by Kant, it is not at all clear how 
phenomenology should evolve from its original critique of psychologism, biologism, 
anthropologism, etcetera that clearly make it an exploration of a priori concepts that 
might underpin future empirical work. It is this movement from the theoretical to the 
empirical, and reflection on any new empiricism that has not transpired in fulfilling 
what Husserl planned. 
The way to read Husserl is with eyes like a hawk and a memory like an 
elephant. The interpretative problems in reading Husserl involve having to surmise his 
true intentions. This is because it is not possible to infer them from texts without 
understanding how he is addressing his reader. There are few asides to let the reader 
know what problem is being tackled, how the current comments are to be taken and 
precisely what analysis of lived experience is being attempted. Husserl left behind a 
patchwork quilt of research papers that have been edited and translated, yet still do not 
provide an adequate account of the terminological and methodological changes that 
occurred over an output that spanned five decades. Some major concepts and practices 
are hard to define because there are no clear definitions or worked examples of the 
whole process of reflection and variation that was often referred to, but never included 
as full workings. The fragmented writing style in Ideas I, for instance, produces 
different readings from those who have been interested in what Husserlian 
phenomenology promised: a revolutionary account and justification from the very 
contours and dimensions of lived experience itself. Passages within Ideas I could be 
read as a call to arms, to storm the universities and destroy all corrupt concepts and 
conceptualising practices. The problem is that the influence of the past is corrupting 
and this spreads into the present and the future 
- 
that a historical process of hearsay and 
intellectual misdirection prefers the received wisdom of remarks that do not get close 
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to the meaningful world, as discussed by Kant, Husserl, Heidegger and company. In 
terms of overviews of the whole of phenomenological philosophy, Moran (2000b) is 
quite sound although his paper on Husserl and Heidegger (2000a) is more pertinent and 
makes a number of points that are accurate. 
1.4 Intersubjectivity in the therapy literature 
Among some psychodynamic writers (Modell, 1984, Mayer, 1996, Stolorow, Renik, 
2004) and attachment researchers (Aitken and Trevarthen, 1997), intersubjectivity is a 
watchword for representing the immediate inter-responsiveness of communication of 
all kinds. Psychodynamic therapy contains several portrayals of intersubjectivity and 
has taken it up as watchword for thinking about therapy and the human situation. 
Therapy "is pictured here as a science of the intersubjective, focused on the interplay 
between the differently organized subjective worlds of the observer and the observed. 
The observational stance is always one within, rather than outside, the intersubjective 
field... the observer is also the observed", (Atwood and Stolorow, 1984, p 41-2). 
Stolorow has made an agreeable statement but did not provide the details: 
"transference and countertransference together form an intersubjective system of 
reciprocal mutual influence", (1994, p 10). Similarly, "each participant's reaction is a 
product of his/her construal of the cues communicated by the other", (Eagle, 1993, p 
102, fn). These are prior attempts to get away from individual, non-relational thinking 
and may even try to take into account the effects of changes in empathic ability. Often 
empathy is merely understanding emotion or being influenced by the emotions of 
others (Shapiro, 1974). 
Therapy has many pictures of the other. Overall there is no consensus. Two 
therapists from the same school may use the same concepts. But what they refer to, and 
their interpersonal style with clients, may be quite different. There have been estimated 
to be 400 therapy theories (Karasu, 1986). But whether there are 400 styles of 
practising and theorising or more likely, an infinite variation of practice and thought, 
the therapeutic relation has long been noted as central: 
The key to the influence of psychotherapy on the patient is in his 
relationship with the therapist. Wherever psychotherapy is accepted as a 
significant enterprise, this statement is so widely subscribed to as to 
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become trite. Virtually all efforts to theorize about psychotherapy are 
intended to describe and explain what attributes of the interactions 
between the therapist and the patient will account for whatever behavior 
change results. 
Bordin, 1959, p 235. 
The quotation clearly indicates that the therapeutic relationship is the medium for 
improvement or deterioration. It is agreed that any relationship is an empathic, or 
better, a co-empathic one. The quotation means that in individual therapy, the 
relationship between two persons is the medium of communication. Any lack of focus 
on it as a conscious relation is a concern. Most stances feature a personality theory 
concerning the nature of the self or ego but few have a theory of the relationship with 
the other or of the overall meaningfulness of the cultural world. It is strange that the 
phenomena of the other and social life are taken for granted in therapy. Sometimes, the 
immediate experience of the other is taken as a `fact, ' a `reality, ' yet it falls within the 
hermeneutic circle. For everyday psychological experience, the other person is known 
or not known. Liked or not liked. And may appear as immediately understood or not. 
Often, the lack of reflection that occurs for the everyday includes taking for granted 
that the other is unambiguous in appearing the way they do. No other possibilities are 
considered. 
There have been previous attempts within therapy to create a stance that views 
the therapeutic relationship as intersubjective as well as empathic. Early attempts can 
be subsumed under the heading ` object relations' but these often miss the phenomenon 
of the intentional relation. Some are inspired by a study of infant development where 
the infant is understood as "interiorized interaction: not simply the environment's 
response, but the mutual influence between the two", (Beebe and Lachmann, 1988, p 
8). The beginnings of a contextual understanding are found in comments such as the 
human "field that is observed, of necessity, includes the observer", (Kohut, 1984, p 
41). In an overview of these developments... 
... 
this vision of the basic unit of study is not the individual as a separate 
entity whose desires clash with external reality, about an interactional 
field within which the individual arises and struggles to make contact 
and to articulate himself. Desire is experienced always in the context of 
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relatedness, and it is that context of relatedness, which defines meaning. 
Mind is composed of relational configurations 
... 
Experience is 
understood as structured through interactions. 
Mitchell, 1988, p 3-4. 
What Mitchell means is that individualism is a wrong turn. Contextualisation of the 
individual and their intentional relations is preferable. Fairbairn is often cited as the 
first post-Freudian to set psychodynamics on the path to understanding human nature 
in a worthy fashion. For him it was "impossible to gain any adequate conception of the 
nature of an individual organism if it is considered apart from its relationship to its 
natural object, for it is only in its relationship to these objects that its true nature is 
displayed", (Fairbairn, 1946/1954, p 139). Where the use of the, word "natural" means 
genuine rather than material. What Fairbairn warned is not to decontextualise clients or 
their thoughts, feelings and relationships with others, for risk of misrepresenting the 
fact that human beings live in a socio-historical habitat of other people. Such writers 
try to revise psychodynamic theory in terms of stressing a developmental perspective. 
Development is agreed by the thesis as being important. For instance: "The origin... of 
individual psychic life... is a transindividual field, represented by the mother/infant 
matrix, not an individual unconscious and instincts residing in an individual", 
(Loewald, 1988, p 50-51). These relational perspectives are argued as being accurate 
descriptions of the lived meaningful and relational situation. 
Empirical researchers and therapists alike use "intersubjectivity" to capture the 
inter-responsive interconnection between people (Diamond and Marrone, 2003, Bott- 
Spillius, 2004, Renik, 2004a, 2004b). But intersubjectivity could be misconstrued. For 
instance, Aitken and Trevarthen (1997, p 669) note that "joint awareness" and "joint 
referencing" exist as part of affective and non-verbal communication. Joint awareness 
and joint referencing occur in the type of conceptual intentionality inherent in speech 
and non-verbal communication. Aitken and Trevarthen note that psychological theory 
generally "does not adequately address... both cognitive (individualist) and 
intersubjective (communitarian) aspects" despite both being "necessary in the 
formulation of an adequate theory of the emergence of human mental functions", 
(1997, p 655). This entails an account concerning how such phenomena can be 
recognised within observable interactions themselves. For Husserl, the intersubjective 
situation is familiar and his portrayal of it is in broad agreement with parts of Aitken 
IX) 
and Trevarthen's view. 
1.5 Intentionality, reduction, noema 
There are many intricate parts to the Husserlian whole and to omit any of the central 
elements is to misrepresent its Gothic twists and turns of plot and argument. 
Consciousness is intersubjective, pre-reflexive, and concerns the universal absolute 
rationalisations of necessity of there being Here and There perspectives that are given 
through the empathic, Objective and cultural-historical conditions for meaning, as 
defined in the Cartesian Meditations. Phenomenology is fundamentalist and has a co- 
ordinating purpose of finding the types of intentional relation for a community of 
thinkers who address themselves to regions of being. Great care is required to stick to 
the letter and spirit of the texts. This thesis claims that the proper reading of 
Meditations is to understand that what resides in all intersubjective experience (TS, 
§40) is something that can be called "inter-perspectivity". The new word emphasises 
that intersubjectivity co-exists with the possibility of gaining another perspective on 
the self-same cultural object. 
The term intentionality refers to all types of intentional relation between 
consciousness and object and to the object of other consciousness. An introductory 
contribution has been made on intentionality by Hall (1982), which rather misses the 
point that all meaning is an achievement and that there are many types of 
intentionality. Pre-reflexive `intentionality' works together with egoic intentionality- 
proper to create all types of object and meaning. De Murault is fairly accurate in 
overview (1974). There are other texts in the bibliography which have been read and 
found to be of assistance including a two-part paper from Husserl in 1939 (1975) 
which helps to set the scene, as well as making comparisons to Ideas III and what is 
printed in English as the "Epilogue" to Ideas 11, which was first published as the 
"Author's Preface" to the 1931 Gibson translation of the 1913 version of Ideas I. 
Something needs to be made of the abundance of papers on the transcendental 
reduction. "Reduction" means taking back to an original trustworthy type of givenness. 
It is argued that only Fink (1970), De Boer (1978) and Ströker (1993, p 60, fn 34) get it 
right. The transcendental reduction produces an attitude of withholding judgements 
concerning the existence of any object of attention. The transcendental reduction 
suspends both belief and disbelief to produce neutrality and disinterestedness towards 
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what appears, a state that Freud called "free floating attention". Papers on the 
transcendental reduction generally sketch aspects of the full stance. Schmitt (1971) is 
quite accurate but sketchy. Ricoeur (1978) is introductory. Hartmann (1971) stresses 
links to Kant, as the reduction aims to prevent jumping between false metabases (CPR, 
p 338/A 458), false foundations, but otherwise he is not accurate on method. There are 
contributions from Ballard (1972), Bossert (1974), Küng (1975) and Mirvish (1995) 
where the latter is only introductory in scope. The transcendental phenomenological 
stance is given a brief characterisation in Landgrebe (1970). Philipse (1995) and Kates 
(1979) discuss transcendental idealism and the presence of ideals and the empirical in 
Husserl's thinking, as does Marbach (1982,1984,1994). A full attention to Husserl's 
stance between idealism and realism would prevent any confusion on this account (cf 
IP, Id I, CM). Spiegelberg's 1974 paper is noteworthy for its lack of understanding of 
basic issues. Notable additions to these most trustworthy pieces are those comments on 
the reduction by Boehm (1965), van Breda (1977), Drummond (1975), Elveton (1970), 
Keirby (1997), Scanlon (1972,1981), Seebohm (1989) and the brief characterisation 
given by Ricoeur (1967). 
There are other works specifically on the noema such as the edited collection 
by Drummond and Embree (1992). Atwell (1969) clarifies the differences between 
ideal objects and moments of the whole of signification in-line with The Idea of 
Phenomenology. Sokolowski (1984), Tharakan (1998) and Holmes (1975) contribute 
readings that lend themselves to my interpretation of the noema as membership of a set 
of variants about a core of constant identity. All these papers are insightful and paint a 
picture of the noema as a polythetic concept and a basis for an "eidetic science" with 
colleagues. The thesis takes the objective side of the noema as a focus on the object, 
similarly to Boolean algebra, where multiple views of the noema `overlap' to indicate 
an area of commonality and agreement across time. Worthwhile interpretative help 
comes from some early writers such as Salmon (1929) who provided details of'the 
basic aims of Husserl's work and Fink's papers from 1934 and 1939 are helpful. There 
is an area of debate concerning whether a noema is an ideal concept of higher 
intentionality or whether it is the givenness of imagination, recollection or an 
exemplary occurrence of any object or synthesis of consciousness. Because this thesis 
follows the leadership of Marbach (1992) on the noema, whilst taking into account 
comments by Bernet, on noema as belief (BKM, p 50, p 176) and Ströker (1993, p 95- 
111) on the identity and difference of noema as constancy. The writings of Langsdorf 
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(1984), Larabbee (1986), Sokolowski (1984) and Drummond (1990) appear to be the 
most reliable. These all portray the noema as both a given or a conceptually given 
object, according to the type of object and the manner of interpretations that are being 
carried out. 
1.6 Eidetic method and worked examples 
Mohanty's (2003) paper on Husserl is decisive in that it argues that Heidegger's 
critique of Husserl was "never convincing". But his (1991) chapter on the imaginative 
variation is noteworthy for being inaccurate and misleading. Generally, there are so 
few detailed accounts of eidetic variation that they can be concluded a very short 
space. 
It also has to be noted that Husserl used "seeing a priori essences" as a form of 
research rather than a means of hypothesis creation or testing, or as a means of drawing 
final conclusions. In his unpublished work he explored different eidetic possibilities 
that become expressed in the conceptual changes within the published work. In this 
effort, he continually developed his conclusions on the essences of consciousness and 
objects-for-consciousness. This exploration of essences is understood as a parallel to 
the concept of mathematical determinacy in the natural sciences of physical nature. 
The character of eidetic phenomenology is generalising what is the case and 
what must be, as a series of thought experiments (PP, §§9,10). The literature on 
eidetic variation is most deficient. Spader (1995) makes a barely adequate contribution 
that is at least preferable to Kasely (1997) who has not appeared to have read the 
definitive texts of Ideas I, Phenomenological Psychology and Meditations where the 
process of variation is made abundantly clear. Despite the details given on essences in 
Ideas III and Ideas I, this topic reaches maturity in Phenomenological Psychology. It is 
the case that the text of Ideas III also provides many clear details of the nature of 
eidetic exploration and variation. Of the leading texts on Husserlian phenomenology, 
none give overall details of the full set of procedures and reasons for each of the fine 
twists and turns, according to the first principles by which Husserl sought to establish 
his eidetic approaches. Although many English language works in psychology and 
psychotherapy claim to introduce Husserl from the perspective of professional 
philosophy, they are seen by this thesis to be introductory or inaccurate. Despite the 
many unreliable partial introductions to the whole, a search of the literature has 
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produced only one short replication of Husserl's actual practice of reflection (Smith, 
1977), and one description of what appears to the transcendental attitude (Salmon, 
1929). The thesis is an attempt at a conclusion on Husserl's reflection and the seeing 
and variation of essences. 
Furthermore, the books and papers I have read on Husserl have not one 
accurate worked example of a step by step definition of Husserl's method of seeing, 
eidetic explication and variation or any significant execution of seeing, in-line with 
Husserl's instructions. No authoritative manual of Husserlian practice is in existence 
with the exception of Marbach's conclusions on noetic analysis (1992,1993,1999) and 
other notes on method (1982,1988a, 1994). As far as I can ascertain, no detailed 
replication of the full process of seeing and concluding has been achieved. Sokolowski 
provides a largely accurate introductory sketch but he provides no workings to guide 
readers nor any references to originals texts (2000). 
Levin (1968) is the only person to have commented on induction in the method 
of variation and therefore is a person who supports the `empiricism of essence' view I 
have made clear (section 5.3). Others have made contributions to the major focus on 
method and have shown Husserl to be proposing methods as answers to the conceptual 
grounding of any empirical praxis (Kersten, 1989). One claim is that there is no 
phenomenological method that is entirely against the letter of Husserl (van de Pitte, 
1977). Strasser (1977) provides an excessive focus on phenomenology at the time of 
Logical Investigations. 
1.7 The Idea of Phenomenology 
There are few English language works on The Idea of Phenomenology that provide an 
intimation of the complexities in this important statement. One paper by Taminiaux 
(1988) covers the issues reasonably well and there are other reliable commentaries by 
Kern (1977), Bernet, Kem and Marbach (1993) and Ströker (1983,1988b, 1993,1997) 
that are helpful in clarifying terminology and its various developments in an 
authoritative manner. The most helpful overview of phenomenology in relation to the 
acts of consciousness and intentionality is Marbach (1993) and the preparatory 
overview on essence by Null (1989). Other background comments on the term 
"absolute" are given by Boehm (1970): Welton (1983, p 123) is accurate in his brief 
introduction of the terminology of real (natural and worldly) and reell, concrete parts 
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of an act or synthesis, and the irreell eidetic sphere. There are brief comments by Tran 
(1954/1986) on this text and Ideas Ithat are accurate. 
The type of phenomenology that is being proposed in The Idea of 
Phenomenology is an early 
-version of transcendental phenomenology (cf Husserl, 
1974). A transcendental reduction is in use and is implied as being statutory for 
transcendental phenomenology before the eidetic reduction ("eidetic abstraction") can 
begin. What this means is that these lectures begin the work of comparing and 
contrasting the objective manners of givenness, thereby ascertaining the implications 
between different types of cognitive processes that occur in different ways, and the 
nature of those processes. The direct seeing of the constitution in an all-embracing 
immanence of worldly meaning, reveals that it has various moments. Meaning includes 
the introjection, maintenance and projection onto the world, of its objects, ideas and 
persons. 
Phenomenology in 1907 can be classified as that which concerns the 
accumulations of sense. It becomes a basis in the 1920s for properly "genetic" seeing 
of the sedimentations of sense for a transcendental ego. Although the method of 
reflection focuses on what appears for self. Meaning is always intersubjective, cultural, 
societal and historical. These communal aspects are constituted by an intersubjective 
community (Langsdorf, Watson and Bower, 1996) in connection with processes 
common to each transcendental ego and consciousness2. The term "transcendental ego" 
or "transcendental I-pole" has to be approached with caution because it includes 
absolute consciousness which is a form of self-presence that produces the natural I that 
is felt and described as oneself (Salmon, 1929, BKM, p 216). Contrary to many 
readings of Husserl, particularly those influenced by Heidegger, it is clear that 
consciousness is considered as immanent and transcendent, private and public. There is 
no gap between mind and matter, subject and object, for Husserl. 
As regards the development of the method, Sokolowski (1964, p 144) renders 
phenomenology in 1907 to be an example of the static phenomenology of static 
constitution. This is true insomuch that Husserl did not consider the whole process of 
2 Eventually, the overall perspective on this constitutive source relates to a community 
within the overall history of civilization. Although it is not stated in The Idea of Phenomenology, the overall picture of consciousness in 1907 is an intersubjective and temporal one (Bernet, 1994a) as can be seen from the comments on layers of sense in Time. 
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the accumulation of sense. But it is not true that phenomenology is not concerned with 
temporal accrual of the object (IP, p 67/11) or not concerned with history in the early 
years (PRS). Generally, the genetic phenomenology of genetic constitution did not 
begin until 1917 to 1920 and can be seen in a more developed form in the papers of 
Experience and Judgement, Formal and Transcendental Logic and in Analyses on 
Passive Synthesis. 
1.8 On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time 
For English readers who have no access to the Nachlaß, or the Husserliana volumes 
on passive synthesis and the finer points of Husserl's analyses (Hua VIII), the Time 
book is not a good source for analysing what he actually did, or how he classified and 
reasoned according to what he saw, because its words hint at what is being commented 
on and this gives the text an inexplicit quality. All dates of specific papers within the 
main text are accepted according to Bernet (1985, cited in Brough, 1991, p xvii) and 
not according to those given by Boehm, the editor of Husserliana X in 1966. The only 
dependable overview of Husserl's conclusions on temporality in English is provided 
by Kern (BKM, pp 101-114). However, even this account is brief and possibly badly 
translated, so it does not provide sufficient details of the full picture of consciousness 
that can only be gained by a focus on Kern (1988). When the latter paper is read with 
the account in Bernet, Kern and Marbach, only then does the temporal picture fall into 
place. 
There are other notable papers on parts of the temporal whole by Bernet (1982, 
1987,1993a) and Sokolowski (1964). Both of whom have studied the original 
manuscripts in the Husserl Archives. Other noteworthy papers on Freud and Husserl 
are those by Seebohm (1992) and Mishara (1990). Some of the papers from the period 
before 1910 keep the image of linearity of the absolute "flow". This image is 
misleading and should have been fully edited away because the "flow" is immediately 
in contact with all aspects of consciousness. Papers from Part B are writerly comments 
and show the presence of his argument by eidetic necessity (cf Id III, §9). Something 
unusual occurs in consciousness because there is a complete simultaneity of cognitive 
interaction between all aspects of absolute consciousness, in connection and 
organisation with retentional consciousness, and the constituted present awareness. 
This finding is contrary to the natural attitude assumption that there is only a linear 
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flow from the future into the present, and from the present into the past. For the natural 
attitude, material from the past is assumed to be out of awareness and has no influence 
on the present. Such a linearity of temporality, a `time line, ' is a wrong understanding 
because it does not pay attention to the phenomena that appear and must be interpreted. 
The equi-primordiality of absolute consciousness is important because it co-occurs 
with the constitution of the senses, self and other. 
1.9 Ideas I 
The Kersten translation has been altered after a paper on the translation by A. Smith 
(1997). Ideas I was the first part of an intended trilogy that was never published in 
Husserl's lifetime. In some ways it extends and clarifies the project of the intentional 
analysis of the processes of affect and cognition, via the focus on objects-for- 
consciousness in the world. In other ways, it gives a purposefully false impression, as 
Husserl refused to discuss temporal constitution, bodiliness, and the analysis of 
cognition and made no clear argument concerning how he had appropriated Kant's 
project. The influences in Ideas I include those of the part and whole ontology, from 
the second of the Logical Investigations, which are reapplied in the eidetic 
investigation of the many manners of constitution of any object (LI II, §§36-39; Id I, 
§§2-17, §§70-75). The point being that the whole, of the manners of constitution, 
shines light on a specific manner of constitution. 
Although Ideas I was intended as a basic manual of phenomenology, because it 
introduces so many fine distinctions, often by synonyms, it is hard to distinguish the 
main points and emphases that Husserl intended without the help of expert 
commentators. Consequently, Marbach's work has been consulted to define the 
method of comparison of the objective manners of givenness. Also, it needs to be 
noted that the method is still not yet fully mature at the time of writing and the 
marginal revisions and annotations do not improve its clarity. The task of defining the 
transcendental reduction is not sufficiently complete until Cartesian Meditations. 
The noteworthy literature on Ideas I includes all those perspectives that agree 
with Marbach's leadership in pointing out the role of the noematic character of objects. 
Other helpful explanations come from Bernet, Kern and Marbach (1993) although their 
presentation omits some points and is-condensed. The most insightful comments are 
those from Ströker (1987,1988a, 1993), which help set the context alongside other 
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comments from Bernet (1987,1988b, 1994a, 1996) and Marbach (1992). 
1.10 Ideas II, Phenomenological Psychology and pure psychology 
There is little written on pure psychology as Husserl intended it to be. Embree (1994) 
makes only general comments between a phenomenological and a natural approach. 
Davidson makes sound comments on the constancies within Husserl's writing but does 
not go as far as interpreting noeses, using eidetic variation or arguing in terms of a 
priori propositions or for that type of interpretation (1988). D. Smith (1995) uses the 
idea of parts and wholes to investigate the differences between consciousness, Leib and 
Körper adequately in-line with Husserl's comments (Id II, §62, p 294-5/281-2, PP, 
§15, p 83/109, CM, §58, p 135/162). 
There is a small literature on Philosophy as Rigorous Science including a 
chapter by McCormick (1981) but the lack of commentaries on it is a serious shortfall, 
considering its parallel relation to the introduction of Being and Time. For instance, 
there are comments in Philosophy as Rigorous Science that have been adopted by 
Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. Among the reinterpretations of Husserl by later writers, 
including Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, the frequent omissions of the 1911 
manifesto mean that misguided accusations are made against Husserl. Husserl is 
accused of reifying consciousness or ignoring the other and history. Such accusations 
are clearly not the case. The comments towards the end of the manifesto concern the 
implications of eidetic science for the praxis of the everyday. Therefore, Philosophy as 
Rigorous Science, Ideas II! and Ideas II are close to ontology and existential- 
phenomenology, but are not classifiable as such because they do not focus on the 
themes as laid down by Jaspers (1963) and developed by the French writers including 
Sartre (195 8,1960,1970) and Merleau-Ponty (1962). 
Sound overviews of existential-phenomenology are provided by Howarth 
(1991) and Keat (1991). But for Husserl, existential-phenomenology, Heidegger's 
phenomenology, pure psychology, and all other sciences and philosophy, remain in the 
natural attitude. Allegedly, nothing of the natural attitude is acceptable for the project 
of transcendental phenomenology that must have rid itself of all such contamination. 
Ideas II is another major text that is not covered sufficiently well, except for 
notable exceptions by Elliston (1977); Montes (1990), Scanlon (1989,1993,1996), 
Smillie (1971) and Hall (1979). The literature has some papers on empathy and 
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consciousness (Drummond, 1996, Makkreel, 1996, Nenon, 1996). The comments by 
Merleau-Ponty on bodiliness are accurate in portraying Husserl's notion of empathy 
and bodiliness (1968). Steinbock discusses the role of the world at this time (1996). 
Ideas II represents a loose collection of research papers on the constitution of the sense 
of the regions of nature, and individual and intersubjective objectivity, written during 
the years 1913 to 1920 mainly. My reading of Ideas 11 is one that stresses the facets of 
the phenomenological understanding of contextuality and bodiliness. 
Gurwitsch (1964,1965,1974) is one of the few writers to focus briefly on the 
core theme of appresentation. Gurwitsch commented that Phenomenological 
Psychology is concordant with respect to the content of Ideas II and Crisis. He also 
wrote that Phenomenology and the Amsterdam Lectures are both "addenda" to the 
lectures of 1925. This is largely correct. A commentary on Phenomenology is omitted 
in favour of some clearer points on the two perspectives of pure psychology and 
transcendental phenomenology in the Amsterdam Lectures. In comparison to later 
comments in Cartesian Meditations (§43), the approach in 1929 to empathy is a static 
phenomenology (§7, p 43/59) although there is much discussion of seeing the 
"originary sources of sense" within a whole concrete surrounding world (§6, p 39/53). 
It is not mentioned until section 43, that both static and genetic approaches to 
constitution can occur, but there is insufficient detail in the Meditations by itself, to 
define phenomenology. 
There is a shortage of papers that explicate the stance of pure psychology. 
Buytendijk (1987a, 1987b) provides two general overviews. Armstrong (1977) is one 
of the few people that realises the importance of intersubjective implication across the 
years from Ideas II, Paris Lectures, Meditations and Crisis. He also focuses on the 
early constitution of the object in Time. All these remarks are pertinent to pure 
psychology. Scanlon (1989) sketches out a portion of the research attitude of pure 
psychology but does not spell out the stance or method. Therefore, there is a lack of 
interest in pure psychology amongst human scientists, social scientists, philosophers, 
psychologists and psychotherapists, which is lamentable. It is worth putting together 
some of the key ideas from Husserl's definitions. In 1927, Husserl lectured that: 
(4) The term "I" [or "ego"] designates a new direction for investigation 
(still in abstraction from the social sense of this word) in reference to 
the essence-forms of "habituality"; in other words, the "I" [or "ego"] as 
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subject of lasting beliefs or thought-tendencies - "persuasions" - 
(convictions about being, value-convictions, volitional decisions, and so 
on), as the personal subject of habits, of trained knowing, of certain 
character qualities. 
P, §5, p 166-7/286. 
The earlier text makes comments in a similar vein: 
1) The title Apriority means: this psychology aims first of all at all 
those essential universalities and necessities, without which 
psychological being and living are simply inconceivable: Only 
subsequently does it proceed to the explanation of psychological facts, 
to theory, precisely their eidetic explanation, which is for us the first 
interest. 
PP, §4, p 33/46. 
The following is a general definition. 
(2) The exploration of single forms of intentional psychic processes 
which in essential necessity generally must or can present themselves in 
the mind; in unity with this, also the exploration of the syntheses they 
are members of for a typology of their essences: both those that are 
discrete and those continuous with others, both the finitely closed and 
those continuing into open infinity. 
P, §5, p 166/286. 
The above is a comment concerning interpreting mental processes. Frequently, Husserl 
made misleading statements that are not at all representative of what is method fully 
entailed: "2) The title of intuition or description designates for us then the source of 
this a priori... ", (PP, §4, p 33/46). What the method really entails is the following: "(3) 
The showing and 
. 
eidetic description [Weserdeskription] of the total structure 
[Gesamgestalt] of psychic life as such; in other words, a description of the essential 
character [Wesensart] of a universal "stream of consciousness", (P, §5, p 166/286). 
But even this statement is not clear in how the aims can be achieved. 
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3) 
... 
intentionality... consciousness... personality as such, and 
objectivity as objectivity of consciousness... this twofold centering of 
conscious life... furnishes every inner psychology... the task 
... 
of 
descriptively pursuing... Every category of possible objectivities 
designates an index for a methodic regularity of possible psychic life; 
every possible real world, a regularity of possible intersubjective life. 
PP, §4, p 34/47. 
4) 
... 
as psychologists we do not want to be philosophers... Each can 
begin only as a natural, unphilosophical human being. 
... 
We want to remain in the natural attitude; we want actually to 
be nothing else but psychologists, directed in a natural, human manner 
toward the objective world as actuality, and endeavoring to investigate 
it insofar as it is a world of mind. 
Op cit. 
One comment is that: "(1) The description of the peculiarities universally belonging to 
the essence of an intentional psychic process, which includes the most general law of 
synthesis: every connection of consciousness with consciousness gives rise to a 
consciousness", (P, §5, p 166/286). The same sense occurs in: "5) 
... 
the pure essential 
theory of the mental, of the individually psychic as well as of the socially psychic, and 
of the productions of society, is eo ipso simultaneously a knowledge of the world, with 
regard to the mentality which factually permeates it", (PP, §4, p 35/48). The object of 
pure psychology is... 
6) 
... 
The psychic province 
... 
has a multiplicity of immediate essential 
insights which. continually grows with analysis and is never to be 
limited. Here, mere immediate intuition delivers already a quite endless 
science, an intuitive and descriptive a priori 
... 
The mediate, concluding 
and deducing procedure is not lacking at higher stages, and it leads to 
higher level a priori; but by no means is the entire science of the type of 
a mathematics. "- 
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pp 36-7/50-1. 
What the above makes clear is the development of Kant in Husserl. 
Finally, it would be possible to take phenomenology into a more semiotic 
direction that would be in-line with many of Husserl's constant themes of signs and 
expressiveness of the living body (EW, p 20-51/340-373). This direction would have to 
consider moments of the whole and stay true to the full picture of the moments of 
synthesis, egoic intentionality and cultural intentional implication that together 
comprise the meaningful world. 
1.11 On meta-representation 
The distinctions Husserl made in the Fifth Cartesian Meditation can be further 
embellished in the following way with respect to retrieving some of the core themes 
that show a meta-representational hermeneutics is relevant to psychotherapy. Meta- 
representation is the "ability to represent the representational relation itself, " a 
representation about representations and specifically to represent how others are 
representing a cultural object (Pylyshyn, 1978, p 593). Husserl's distinctions among 
the different forms of intentionality in relation to different senses of the same object is 
a meta-representational theory of mind. The aim of the section is to show the value of a 
meta-representational theory of consciousness that discerns specific sorts of relations 
to objects of different kinds. Meta-representation is: "Explicit understanding 
... 
that 
one and the same representation can have different interpretations" or perspectives and 
this is compatible with hermeneutics (Perner, 199 1, p 102). 
Meta-representation in this context means being able to account for the overall : 
empathic phenomenon of appreciating that another person is turned towards specific 
objects in specific ways. Others have their views of a cultural object that are quasi- 
given to selves. Selves have their view of the cultural object that is given first-hand to 
selves and quasi-given to others, when they empathise selves. Intersubjectivity needs 
to be teased apart so that action and reaction can be interpreted. It is claimed that 
Husserl's Fifth Cartesian Meditation has provided a suitable template to discern the 
givenness of the other and meaning, that will support a useful understanding of the 
quasi-givenness of the meanings of others, the communal or public meanings that 
individuals can make their own. 
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Husserl's work is interpreting the human intentional situation as a meta- 
representational theory of mind (LI I, § 15, p 293160) of the sort that has made its mark 
in developmental psychology (Pemer, 1991). In empathy meta-representation is 
representing that another person is representing. What quasi-appears is their 
perspective on an object in some way. The outcome of empathy is admitting and 
organising the totality of the cosmos of shared meaning to consciousness. Husserl's 
perspective on intentionality and co-intentionality shows such distinctions in the 
experiencing of others. Any failure to acknowledge or portray the other's perspective 
can be understood as a less than adequate understanding of human being in relation to 
the world (and does not involve meta-representation). Transcendental philosophy 
begins with the discussion of conditions of possibility and the Fifth Meditation is a 
statement of the conditions of possibility for meaningfulness of any situation. The 
stance is to consider noesis-noema correlations where different forms of intentionality 
pertain with respect to the givenness of specific types of appearance. From 1912, 
Husserl's pure psychology considered how mental processes "as such" could represent 
cognised being (Id III, §§8,9). The question is how to establish differences among the 
forms of intentionality. 
The topic under discussion is the difference between appearance and being as 
intentional forms. Perner writes that representations that "serve that function" of "close 
causal contact with the world" are "primary representations", (1991, p 6). The same 
sense of intentional distinctions and similarities occurred in Husserl. Perner continues: 
Misrepresentation occurs when the system is not functioning properly 
... 
secondary representations are purposely detached or "decoupled" 
from reality and are at the root of our ability to think of the past, the 
possible future, and even the nonexisting and to reason hypothetically 
... 
metarepresentation [is] 
... 
the ability to represent that something 
(another organism) is representing something. Since the distinction 
between what is represented (referent) and as what is represented 
(sense) is central to the concept of representation, metarepresentation 
requires understanding of this distinction 
... 
Primary representation has 
to occur before secondary representation becomes possible, and 
secondary representation has-- to develop before the concept of 
representation can be represented (metarepresentation). 
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p7. 
What the above means is that there are differences in mental process, and between 
different intentional relations that contribute to different perspectives on the same 
referent. This needs a clear example to make the assertion more tangible. Relating with 
others most often happens without reflection. But that can be rectified through proper 
clarification. In the everyday life, most often, to accept the psychological reality of 
clients means taking them at face value and not thinking about how they have taken up 
a position, with respect to their position in life and their problem. Only further 
reflection, reasoning and contemplation can reveal how a person has adopted a 
perspective. Only further interpretation can begin to understand what that perspective 
is, with respect to psychological knowledge and understanding in general. So, there are 
further ramifications of Husserl's position as expressed in the Fifth Cartesian 
Meditation. 
There are many simple and compound types of being aware. Husserl's work is 
to distinguish the forms of being aware of objects in their basic types. Some of the 
types of intentionality can be listed as follows: (1) perceptual presence without identity 
and temporality are most basic; followed by (2), perception with identity as the next 
higher; then (3), the pure presentiations, such as imagination, recollection and 
anticipation; then (4) picturing presentiation, as the next most complex; and leading to 
(5), empathic presentiation of the perpetually quasi-given sense of the other and their 
perspective; and then the move into (6) the conceptual forms of intentionality which 
are not given perceptually. As Chapter 7 showed, the point about empathy is to 
elucidate the mental activities that are hidden, in an intellectually legitimate way. 
Empathy works through the perceptual intentionality of the other's body carrying a 
number of associations of sense that signify the givenness of the other's perspective. 
These senses also adhere to cultural objects that can be understood in a manifold of 
perspectives. 
Instead of stating that there are oxymoronical `unconscious senses, ' that are the 
obscure products of unconscious processes. It is here asserted that the 
psychotherapeutic attitude of providing psychological help is attending to intentional 
implications between self and other in a social microcosm. Theory for practice can 
follow a tradition that attends to the difference between consciousness and co- 
consciousness; rather than referring meaning and cause to inanimate being. Husserl's 
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ability to distinguish the forms of intentional relation, the manners of reference, is 
more adequate than Freud's. The function of theory is to link between instances and 
provide direction, to point to what is important. Theoretical statements serve the 
purpose of commenting on any specific instance within their region of applicability. 
Marbach explains the sense of `psychological reality' that occurs in the mental 
processes of his own remembering of having been of sitting in a cafe in Venice, as 
follows: 
There is no second Caffe. Ontologically speaking, there cannot be an 
image without a vehicle of it, carrying its appearing, and since I am in 
no way conscious of such a carrier when I rememberingly refer to the 
Caffe, but am conscious only of the Caffe itself, it would seem clear 
that recourse to a mental image of the Caffe supposedly in the mind, 
cannot be accepted as an account of the phenomenon of re-presenting 
the event to be preferred to the descriptive account in terms of I- 
displacement. 
Marbach, 2000, p 86. 
The point is that for empathy, it follows that there is no other current empathic or 
perspectival psychological reality than the one that appears for consciousness, 
according to the hermeneutic beliefs and attitude taken. But this does not mean that 
people can only gain one view of a person or object. This ontological position needs 
careful thought. For instance, the reality given by physics is a relevant perspective on 
material being. But when it comes to the world-for-consciousness, there are no pictures 
or schema neither in the mind nor in the unconscious. 
What is required is a stance that enables the discussion of types of 
intentionality in relation to the enmeshment that is the shared life. It is a necessity in 
theorising people in general, in the human sciences or therapy. Kern and Marbach 
make it clear that "in a Husserlian perspective... it is a question of understanding that 
a person represents the world in a certain way, namely, that she mentally figures to 
herself 
... 
the world 
... 
it is a matter of understanding the motivational connections 
among intentional experiences taking their course through time 
... 
and [how a person] 
posits them as real (`believes' in them) or abandons them as merely apparent, or 
unreal", (2001, p 78). 
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Through meta-representation it is possible to understand the empathised mental 
states of others, so as to detect and comment on their potentially incongruous, deceitful 
or truthful intentions, claims, affects, portrayals of affect and thinking. Incongruity can 
appear currently as it happens or retrospectively, after the fact. There are different 
manners of signification, expressiveness and responses. It is further possible to 
distinguish single and complex forms of incoherent and inadequate types of 
communication, by taking up new perspectives in order to consider a cultural object. 
Meta-representation concerning the difference between that which is attainable 
perceptually and what is unattainable currently, temporarily or permanently, are key 
distinctions in knowing what are one's own limitations, and hence, what forms part of 
oneself and the capabilities of others. Meta-representation appears in judging the 
following differences: 
" 
Self and other can both tell the truth about their perspective on the same object and 
such perspectives can be true and different. It is a further step for the two people to be 
able to agree each other's perspectives as valid. Disagreement is the case where the 
other's perspective is not valued but dismissed or in other ways argued as being faulty 
or incorrect. 
" Imagination is not the same as perception. Both fearful anticipation and psychosis 
seem to begin, for instance, sometimes as an inability to limit imagination to that 
which is perceptually based. Imagination can express wish, desire and possibility. 
Anticipation concerns future possibility. For instance, some wishes, thoughts, desires 
and imaginations can only remain unfulfilled whilst others are fulfilled eventually 
perceptually in experience. 
" It is possible to distinguish the intersubjective function of an intentional form in 
various ways. For instance, with respect to affect as a cultural object, it could be 
defensive, maintain an existing power balance in a relationship, prevent change or 
make security of attachment increase or decrease. The same object could have many 
teleological functions among beliefs, emotions, relationships and associated 
experiences. 
" Conceptual intentionality expressed in speech or writing, could be attempts at lying, 
cheating, manipulation or examples of fearful or depressive rationalisation. In other 
cases, thought can be about inaccurate beliefs concerning the creation of assumptions 
that are incorrect or about beings and states of affairs that are argued to be false. Such 
hindering beliefs might need to be teased out and disputed in order to provide help. 
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Belief means that some experiences are sponsored by an adherence to an intellectual 
position: they occur through adherence to an intellectual stance, rather than an actual 
attention to phenomena. 
The consequence of not adopting meta-representation is that others' 
perspectives cannot be accounted for. To have an inadequate account is as bad as not 
accepting that others have a conscious perspective at all. If it is agreed that the major 
phenomenon of Objective understanding is that all persons have perspectives on an 
Object, then theory should follow suit. If theory cannot or will not follow suit on this 
phenomenon, then the interrelation of perspectives will not occur. Because the 
perspective of the other is important, therapy should attend to meaningfulness of 
conscious experience as a priority. Only then will it be able to pick out the salient 
details in clients' lives and in their current interactions. 
The phenomena mentioned above do appear in the writings of therapists but 
they are not brought together into any overall cognitive-affective theory of the 
constitution of meaning, and are not related to the interrelation of self and other. If 
nothing else the Fifth Meditation is a first sketch of intersubjectivity in a way that does 
not involve natural causality. The following psychological propositions are stated as 
being some theoretical guidelines requiring further development. The perspective of 
therapists and clients are conjoined by Husserl's inter-perspectivity. 
The importance of hermeneutic beliefs in therapy is that clients can be 
interpreted as holding beliefs that determine their behaviour, emotion and relationships 
with others. Furthermore, through believing one way or another, people come to hold 
beliefs about themselves which are related to their connection with others. 
Hermeneutic beliefs play a major role in the psychological life. In the professional 
sphere, beliefs are theoretical and justificatory with respect to the different fields of 
therapy. Theoretical beliefs tie together disparate aspects of practice, supervision, 
empirical research, the understanding of psychopathology and its cure. For instance, 
beliefs define cause and effect, identify specific behaviours as more problematic than 
others, and consequently outline the direction in which clients should move in order to 
decrease their problems. In short, beliefs indicate the area of movement and future 
progress. 
A guiding thought in this analysis is the assumption that beliefs guide actions. 
Indeed, by observing actions, it may be possible to discern what beliefs are manifest. 
The content of belief is that they can vary in their accuracy with respect to the same 
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referent. This can be demonstrated when the nature of the experience of clients is put 
back to them as a form of statement that is easily accessible to them, concerning the 
pushes and pulls of what they. have experienced. For instance, pointing out that a 
bullying boss is similar to a tyrannical stepfather, and linking that to the anger and fear 
felt in the presence of the current boss. Furthermore, rationality or fearful emotion, for 
instance, can govern the link between belief and action. However, in conclusion a 
rationality of some sort is assumed to be discernible among intersubjective events. 
There is not chaos but a regular structure. 
Rather than no link between past and present, the thesis accepts that there is an 
influence but that it is impossible to verify "transference interpretations" because the 
referent can never be re-observed. However, current relationship events, and this form 
of evidence, is argued as being more certain ground because it attends to recent 
perceptual intentionality for client and therapist. Husserl and Penner share compatible 
versions of the same theory. For pure psychology mental processes produce mental 
objects. Whilst not all mental processes are conscious. They do occur in varying 
amount of proximity to the ego and can be understood. The upshot is that to think 
psychologically is in part to differentiate intentional forms. 
Belief is an important topic because it is interpretable in the experiences of 
clients. For instance, a business man and expert in his field is fearful of meetings. No 
one has ever challenged him or criticised him. Yet he is anxious for three hours prior to 
a meeting and he becomes claustrophobic whilst in a meeting room. It can be 
interpreted that he believes that his social performance is poor. This belief is not 
explicit prior to its interpretation by his therapist. Yet once mentioned it can be 
accepted or rejected as an explanation of why he is anxious. The course of therapy 
includes helping him re-evaluate his beliefs about himself and his relations to others. 
Eventually, he comes to accept that his social performance is good and that his belief is 
more coherent with evidence of the totality of his experiences in business meetings. 
Beliefs occupy a hermeneutic role in that they explicitly (or implicitly) can be 
interpreted as providing ontological answers to the nature of the communal life. To 
believe and interpret what exists is to believe and represent a cultural object as 
understood in some way. the manner in which the beliefs accrue can be seen by 
experienced therapists of any sort as having occurred at a specific time. Although these 
explicit or implicit beliefs are accurate or inaccurate concerning the psychological 
cultural object as a referent in some context, they can be interpreted as responsible, 
40 
`causative, ' of the problematic experiences, relationships, emotions and other aspects 
of clients. This means that the problematic beliefs of clients become manifest in their 
problematic emotions, thoughts and relationships. Therapy adopts an interpretative 
stance and can know that it does this in order to help alter the relation between parts 
and wholes, and between senses of a referent. Beliefs can be partial representations as 
opposed to the whole possible set of beliefs about a referent. Beliefs interpret a referent 
in some way. Beliefs are senses of a referent. These beliefs are socially learned through 
experiences in the family, abuse and in other ways. 
The function of theory is to point at what is important. In this case, it is 
important to distinguish through universal consideration about what is co-occurring 
with all meaning and intersubjectivity. In Husserl's language, doxic acts of belief refer 
to all potentially existent referents. In other words, what is of concern is how doxic acts 
refer to existent or believed but non-existent psychological objects. 
This distinction is redolent of a passage in the Logical Investigations where the 
image of a map as a representation for a territory is used and belief is connected to its 
possible fulfilment. 
The real basis of fulfilment does not lie in 
... 
[a word] at all, but in a 
plainly signitive intention intertwined with it... an intention pointing 
beyond the apparent object, and thereby characterizing it as a sign. The 
analogy of what appears and what is meant, which may be present... 
The outline of England as drawn in the map, may indeed represent the 
form of the land itself, but the pictorial image of the map which comes 
when England is mentioned, does not mean England itself in pictorial 
fashion... it is not the object imagined in the latter (the map), which 
counts as the very thing meant by the name, but the original object 
which the name represents. 
LI VI, §20, p 727-8/XIX/2, p 74-5. 
The map-territory distinction is a vivid metaphor to describe the difference between 
linguistic knowledge as it refers to its referent. The map-territory distinction is a 
fruitful one insomuch that the map is always simpler than the territory it represents yet 
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has to be of sufficient complexity for it to function3. For instance, if all specific 
instances of the territory of consciousness were put onto the map of phenomenological 
knowledge, then the map would not function to guide other travellers because it would 
show too many details. Husserl's method of cartography for psychology is a universal 
one that should show the invariants of consciousness for all persons who can then 
`read' in the manner he defined. The map-making process of seeing a priori essences of 
real conditions requires phenomenologists to see their own intentional relations `on 
behalf of others'. 
In terms of the `maps of the world' that distressed persons have, it is possible to 
distinguish between accurate and inaccurate versions with respect to the territory of 
intersubjective world: This is Husserl's intentionality which is equivalent to the topic 
of meta-representation. In another wording, the situation of suffering is motivated by 
having inaccurate maps of belief about Objectivity and intersubjectivity. It is the 
quality of understanding, empathising, that lead to intersubjective distress. Poor 
reasoning and implicit or explicit beliefs contribute to unsatisfying relating to self and 
others, and towards poor ego- and other-constancy and affect-regulation. Bad maps and 
poor map reading contribute towards the inability to satisfy one's basic needs. 
In the domain of understanding consciousness in its intersubjective matrix, if 
one phenomenologist were to follow precisely what Husserl had defined and the map 
produced did not show invariant features for another phenomenologist who had done 
the same, then the method and the map would not be sufficiently defined or 
generalized. Therefore, one criterion for a good phenomenological map is that it should 
be sufficient to enable persons to move around the same territory with ease. 
Accordingly, some aspects of the territory are omitted, for the reason of creating a 
useful representation with respect to the actual territory. The map itself is a generalised 
form, showing the interrelations of key features. 
However, in trying to ascertain the accuracy of the Husserlian map, the 
knowledge born of an accurate relation to the referent, there is the question of how we 
use any other knowledge to relate, criticize or develop Husserl's approach to a 
territory. How can we judge that one map is better than another? There are many 
This same idea occurs in another writer: "important characteristics of maps should be 
noted. A map is not the territory it represents, but, if correct, it has a similar structure 
to the territory, which accounts for its usefulness", (Korzybski, 1933, p 58). Terms 
such as "mapping" and "modelling" could also be used. 
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potential interpretative perspectives. 
It is argued that a meta-representational picture of consciousness has 
advantages over other types of theorising in that it distinguishes between a manifold of 
senses and their referent, The advantage of a meta-representational understanding of 
consciousness and intersubjectivity is that there are marked differences between: 
" Perception or primary representation in the five senses of what is current. 
" 
Presentiation or secondary representation occurs in empathy, recollection, 
anticipation, depiction or imagination, for instance. 
" 
Mis-representation of the differences accuracy and inaccuracy, true or false, occur 
with respect to what is held to be the case, as opposed to what self or others might 
mistakenly believe to be the case. 
These distinctions were explicit in Husserl's theorising about intentionality: For 
instance, picturing presentiation involved in visual works of art occurs through a 
"difference between "picture" and "depictured"", (Id I, §99, p 245/210): Meaning that 
in the case of visual art, the canvass is perceived; whereas the scene that it is about is 
presentiated, depicted in the canvass. Husserl's work is a legacy of taking 
consciousness seriously and being able to create a theoretical discourse about how 
people are aware of meaning and relate to the same meaningful objects in different 
ways. Examples include distinguishing an instance from the generally truthful case; not 
mistaking the model for its actuality. Or distinguishing between perception, 
imagination, speech, delusion and hallucination, and involuted cases such as 
imagination of perception, imagination of empathy, etcetera. Meta-representation is 
understood as crucial to psychological mindedness, contextualising the awareness of 
one's own relationship to others, and the Objectivity of cultural objects in the cultural 
world. Meta-representation, the representation of representations, is at stake in Freud 
but in an inexplicit manner because he classed dreams and transference feelings (mis- 
empathy) as hallucination. The proposed solution to this is that Husserl's Fifth 
Cartesian Meditation is meta-representational in nature. This stance is argued to be a 
criterion for the success or failure of therapy concepts and practices. 
One developmental psychologist in particular has promulgated empirical work 
on the basis of a meta-representational theory of mind. Such a stance is acceptable to 
Husserl's phenomenology. Pcrner has done the most to establish an experimental 
position with respect to the referents-of different types of mental process and the 
cognition of reality. The work of Perner and colleagues is a genuine example of 
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applied pure psychology in developmental psychology. Perner concludes that 
"metarepresentation is in fact indispensable for modelling the information-gathering 
process and thereby understanding how it works and how one can improve it so that 
the model of reality reflects as accurately as possible", (1991, p 40). 
One empirical finding is that three-year-old children "cannot answer explicit 
questions about why a person knows or doesn't know something", (p 151). Perner and 
colleagues also show that the adult experimenters' requirement for a verbal response 
from a four year old is what inhibits the ability of children to communicate their 
understanding. When children are permitted to point, or can answer by merely looking 
in the right direction, or are permitted to respond with physical activity, they point at 
the right answer in meta-representational experiments when they are three. The main 
finding was that children greater than three years old are able to make "a distinction 
between representing a fact and making a judgment about a fact", (Clements and 
Perner, 1994, p 377). 
Wimmer and Perrier (1983, p 103) noted that five to six year olds could tell the 
difference between a lie and a mistaken assumption 94% of the time as opposed to 
28% of the time for four to five year old children. Peskin (1992, p 84) concluded that: 
the "success of the older children in concealing information indicated their new 
representational understanding that to influence another's behavior, one must influence 
that person's mental state". Botterill and Carruthers conclude on behalf of Perner that 
"theory of mind development cannot be explained in terms of quasi-scientific 
theorising, because scientific theorising would be entirely impossible without mind- 
reading ability", (1999, p 94): a reinvention of Husserl's wheel. 
`Mind reading' in an approximate sense, or better "empathy" in Husserl's 
sense, is empathising within the intersubjective world about common referents and 
different perspectives on them. It is a condition for rationality and experimentation. For 
instance, it has been shown empirically that children who have more siblings are likely 
to pass the false belief test earlier than those who have less siblings. One interpretation. 
of this is to conclude that empathic ability, that employs imaginative transposal, is 
move adequately developed through early socialisation (Perner, Ruffman and Leekam, 
1994). 
The meta-representational theory of consciousness could play a wider role in 
therapy and the human sciences in structuring empirical work and research. Meta- 
representational theory enables consciousness to be understood in its intersubjective 
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habitat. Some developmental psychologists have found a focus on the differences in 
perspective between self and other to be an inspiration for further theoretical and 
experimental work in deciding how children, during the first four years of life, gain a 
representational theory of mind (Wimmer and Perrier, 1983, Clements and Perner, 
1994, Peskin, 1992, Perrier, Ruffman and Leekam, 1994). This model has been 
commented on and found of potential use. It is close to Husserl's position of 
transcendental intersubjectivity and has been presented as an explanation of 
psychological reality. This thesis holds a meta-representational theory of mind. Clients 
understand themselves and others, in relation to the whole of humanity. Therapists 
understand themselves and clients, with respect to the same whole, but seen differently. 
1.12 Maintaining ontological dualism for psychology 
People and meanings appear in there own way but interpretative stances appear 
linguistically. It is difficult to work out what Husserl meant by the attitudes towards 
the lifeworld, when the Lebenswelt is the ground of Geistes and Natur, and there are 
two other attitudes towards spirit and nature. The ground of the lifeworld would seem 
to overlap with the spiritual-psychological or intentional attitude, (Kern and Marbach, 
2001, p 76, p 80), and it is sharply demarcated from the natural attitude of 
psychophysics. The stance of the thesis concurs that mental processes are never 
observable in themselves because they co-occur with observable bodily and spoken 
communication. 
The topic of the Lebenswelt or lifeworld in Husserl arose as a potential answer 
to overcoming the ontological duality of Geistes and Natur. The "pre-given world" of 
psychology as a theme appeared in Phenomenology as a Foundation of the Sciences 
(Id III, § 17, p 79/92) and in Ideas I, it was clear that consciousness and the world are 
co-apriori: Sense-bestowing "consciousness 
... 
exists absolutely and not by virtue of 
another sense-bestowal 
... 
the world itself has its whole being as a certain "sense" 
which presupposes absolute consciousness as the field where sense is bestowed", (Id I, 
§55, p 129/107). What comes across during the 1920s is that the lifeworld is the 
genuine ground of all meaning and that it provides a specific shape to human 
knowledge and understanding. 
From Logical Investigations, Philosophy as Rigorous Science and other works, 
it is clear that natural psychological science cannot occupy the role of epistemological 
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foundation. Husserl wanted to overcome the ontological dualism of Geistes and Natur 
by attending to the lifeworld as the genuine ground: Because "every differentiation of 
the sciences which is clear about its origin must be carried out by a return to the 
experiential world", (PP, §7, p 47/64). The Fifth Cartesian Meditation is the best 
example of the universal a priori structure of the lifeworld that relates self to other 
consciousness and to the mutual cultural object, as Chapter 7 has shown. The 
demonstration of a concrete universal structure would bring with it "the corresponding 
form 
... 
for all possible sciences... We survey all its exemplary forms which are 
familiar to us from our experiencing life and inquire after what is typically universal, 
and even so universal that we find it in every world-experience", (PP, §7, p 47-8/64-5). 
As Ideas 11 and the Meditations make clear, pairing by association is the linchpin in 
creating habituated senses and constituting all kinds of composite meaning. 
Understanding speaking or silent other persons (and the case of any cultural object) 
occurs through pairing by association in the lifeworld and that cannot be taken away 
even by the most severe of all reductive abstractions, the reduction to the own world. 
This is Husserl's challenge to Freud. Husserl's pedigree is that he is the true heir of 
Kant. Husserl's advantage is that he has paid attention to the conscious givenness of 
the other in determining transcendental propositions about the conditions of possibility 
for communal intentionality to create Objective sense. 
In Crisis, the lifeworld was given a polythetic definition and was no longer 
`silent' as it was in Phenomenological Psychology and Meditations. Bernet, Kern and 
Marbach assure readers that the experience of the lifeworld "is thus no longer a mute, 
preconceptual intuition, but rather the experience of the actually present [aktuell], 
concrete, historical world, together with its cultural products... a living participation in 
the cultural world", (BKM, p 222). Also, it is interesting to note the method that 
Husserl advocated for transcendental phenomenology in the Crisis. Husserl requested 
phenomenologists to become disinterested in everything except for consciousness, so it 
becomes possible to find oneself caught up in the lifeworld in order to understand the 
aims of others. An "absence from every attitude interested in this respect in truth or 
falsehood" enables such a revelation (BKM, p 227). Although Husserl did not use the 
word "free floating attention, " the attitude is recognisable as non-participant 
observation on concrete human existence, to enable the lifeworld to manifest itself in 
its particular form of givenness. "" 
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Where non-phenomenological, natural forms of science go wrong in their 
involvement with transcendental realism, is that they mistake the part for the whole. 
What appears for natural science is dislocated from the domain of conscious meaning. 
For Husserl and phenomenology, meaning in the intersubjective lifeworld, in the 
context of history, is the proper ground. The human habitat is primarily a meaningful 
one. It is a perversion of thought to consider natural science as the proper 
representation of this fundamental situation. Natural science can only ever be 
derivative with respect to the qualitative ground of the lifeworld. 
Let us take these topics a little further. This thesis does not believe that it is any 
simple concern to make assertions about how consciousness works. Accordingly, to 
state that there is equivalence between meaning-for-consciousness and material events 
within the neurology, chemistry or the physicality of the body, is to state a 
contradiction. On the one hand, meaning and meaning-for-consciousness 
- 
and, on the 
other hand, material events in the living human being - are two very different domains. 
For Freud or psychodynamics to claim there is a dualism is to collapse the distinction 
between consciousness, self-consciousness and meaning for it 
- 
and the physical 
substrate which cannot be conscious. Despite Husserl's efforts to overcome dualism, 
Ströker maintains that he was unable to do so. If she is correct, his dualism is one that 
takes "without question the difference between body and soul as it had been 
historically prefigured in a dualism of the two sides of the human subject" and attends 
to "different modes of givenness, which he could make transcendentally perspicuous in 
detail only through a number of abstract divisions", (1993, p 131). Husserl's dualism is 
not the same of Descartes and both identify a genuine distinction. To proclaim that all 
of what Descartes wrote on dualism of the body and mind is a problem that has been 
overcome is to deny the differences that the Meditations on First Philosophy 
commented on. Descartes' analysis of the being of consciousness, as different to 
material being, is a useful counter-assertion against natural psychology which would 
have therapy believe that the genuine way forward is only to focus on inferable 
mentation (the "computational level" in Smith, 1994, p 149) or such a level in relation 
to the neuroscientific perspective. Naturalism means that the true ground for therapy as 
a natural science is to prefer natural being in order to understand meaning (sic) and so 
prefer natural science over hermeneutic inquiry. 
What is acceptable for this thesis is the stance of ontological dualism as it 
applies to the two types of givenness of consciousness and the living body in 
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psychological context, 'as they appear to consciousness. Descartes wrote: "It is true that 
I may have 
... 
a body that is very closely joined to me. But nevertheless, on the one 
hand I have a clear and distinct idea of myself, in so far as I am simply a thinking, non- 
extended thing; and on the other hand I have a distinct idea of body, in so far as this is 
simply an extended, non-thinking thing", (MFP, p 54). To an extent this is similar to 
the Husserlian account of noematic givenness of two facets of human being, the living 
body, Leib, and consciousness embodied in it. Descartes developed an account of the 
relation between consciousness and body: 
In fact I have never seen or perceived that human bodies think; all I 
have seen is that there are human beings, who possess both thought and 
a body. This happens as a result of a thinking thing's being combined 
with a corporeal thing... Also, the fact that we often see two things 
joined together does not license the inference that they are one and the 
same; but the fact that we sometimes observe one of them apart from 
the other entirely justifies the inference that they are different. 
p 115. 
The quotation above argues that consciousness and the body are two different forms of 
givenness despite their interpenetration. This is a conclusion that Husserl supported for 
pure psychology, a perspective that works within the nexus of realism to an extent. In 
comparison, Freud's philosophical and psychological stance is incoherent. He is 
clearly against a dualism that attends to conscious meaning; and for a natural science 
approach of psychological energy, unconscious mentation and neurology that has 
somehow reconciled the difference between meaning-for-consciousness 
- 
and the 
material nature of the living body. Therefore, a philosophical and psychological 
question is ducked rather than answered by Freud. 
The point of the mass of background material presented above is to show some 
of the details of the relevant debates that exist within the areas of Freud and Husserl 
studies. 
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Appendix 2 
Interpreting the Cartesian Meditations 
Aim: The first section reinforces the conclusions provided by Chapters 6,7 and 8. The 
remainder of the comments are on the Cartesian Meditations literature. 
2.1 The analysis of phenomena and elucidation 
This section further considers the detail of the argument and distinctions Husserl made. 
Phenomenon P1: Perceptual givenness is the type that appears to the perceptual senses 
in the current moment, the original temporal field. It is a mixed representation overall. 
Phenomena P2a, b, c, d: There are of several different types of presentiated givenness. 
They occur with forms of adding sense to a perceptual object. Empathic presentiation 
is one of these types that occur in the specific generation of the sense of other people, 
their perspective on the cultural object and world and have cultural senses. 
Phenomenon P2a: The givenness of the other concerns understanding other persons as 
Leiben fellow human beings who are physically separate to self yet persons who 
participate in the shared meaningful world with self. 
Phenomena P2a, b, c, d: Empathic presentiation extends to the ability to transpose 
oneself imaginatively in to the perspective of the other, in order to imagine their view 
on the same cultural object that appears to self. But for the other, the object appears 
from a different perspective. It is assumed that self is able to do this successfully by 
Husserl. 
Phenomenon P2b: The phenomenon of specific expressive nonverbal meanings of the 
other is constituted according to specific gestures of their body. The nonverbal 
expressiveness of the other's body acts as a carrier or signifier for a basic sense of 
meaningfulness of its movements and potential movements. 
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The presence of knowledge and understanding of any sort, when attended to in 
the attitude of analysing its genesis, show two related phenomena, P3 and P4. Instances 
of understanding one object may change across time but its referent does not: Husserl's 
empirico-idealism. All understanding has a primal institution. 
Phenomenon P3: In the case of the other, there is a first-ever occurrence of otherness. 
This is the result of a genetic eidetic variation and is only experienced as an imagined 
possibility: It can never be seen and is not remembered. 
Phenomenon P4: There is a first-ever sense of self co-occurring with the first-ever 
sense of other. 
Then there are a series of phenomena that refer to intersubjective life. 
Phenomenon P5 includes all phenomena concerning the senses self, other and human 
reality: Intersubjective life is the whole that verifies and nullifies all senses of self, 
other, world and objects in the world. Specific parts of the overall intersubjective 
experience can be identified as Identically self and other. Therefore, P3, the Identical 
other in self, is modified when it applies to other persons. 
Phenomenon P6: The usual sense of the transcendental ego excludes all otherness from 
itself even though it is the source of such sense. The transcendental ego, like the other, 
is empathic or co-intentional; Identical; has a paired sense to intersubjectivity through 
understanding itself as a Leibkörper; it is leibliche and perceptual. 
Phenomenon P7: The transcendental ego has a bodily absolute givenness Here with 
potential verifiability. As regards its body, the transcendental ego is comprised of three 
elements. There is the on-going sense of Leib; the understanding of oneself as a Korper 
in space that is visible to others; and the amalgamated sense of oneself as Leibkörper. 
There is a transcendentally reduced sense of self that includes intersubjective senses in 
itself and appears to others as a cultural object. 
Phenomenon P8: There is a forced reduction to ownness where only the correlates of 
self appears, the own world or Lebenswelt, and the consideration of intersubjective 
phenomena that remain, includes empathising other selves and their constitutive 
processes as inferences. 
The following links occur between the phenomena and the transcendental 
distinctions that can be gained from considering their possibility. 
The difference between phenomena P1 and P2a, P2b, provides the distinction 
that perceptual givenness and presentiated givenness are not the same. In connection 
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with the cognitive assumption, which assumes it is permissable to assume cognitive 
activity, all senses are assumed to have been constituted by consciousness. 
Phenomena concerning presentiation and development of understanding over 
time, provide the distinction that the primal institution is the first-ever achievement of 
the sense of an object of any sort. This also applies for the primal institution of the 
sense of the other, P3. Not seen but drawn from eidetic necessity. 
Phenomenon P5 provides the distinction that the observably Identical referent 
means that specific noeses can refer to it in different ways yet still recognise the 
Identical. Husserl concluded that Identical senses of self, other and their difference are 
maintained. (In the case of the sense of the Identical senses of self and other, both these 
and their Identical difference, are constituted by consciousness, because of the 
cognitive assumption). 
Phenomenon P1 provides the distinction that the transcendental aesthetics of 
thing-constitution, of the perceptual object, is the lowest form of the recognition of any 
Identical perceptual object. Once that has been intentionally achieved, empathic 
presentiation is assumed to follow a similar course: that it too is a specific type of 
addition to human beings but at a higher level that requires there to be further additions 
of sense. 
The remaining distinctions concern intersubjectivity and how empathic 
presentiation `is with the other' that show the Objectivity of cultural objects for self 
and other. 
The differences between various aspects of self provide the distinction that 
there is a first pairing between the three aspects of self and the possibility of similar 
perspectives on the visual object of the other's Körper. 
Because of phenomena P1 and P2, there arises the distinction that people are 
spacially separate. The sense of first-hand otherness remains other to self. 
Because of comparison of reflections on phenomena P2a, P2b and P2c, the 
distinction arises that the sense of the other is a complex modification of the sense of 
self, including leibliche and körperlich aspects, plus further pairings of sense still to be 
identified. 
Phenomenon P2b provides further understanding of the nature of a second 
pairing that occurs between self and other, such that the other's Körper comes to be 
understood as a meaningful object that has its own living body, Leib. 
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Because of phenomenon P5, vice versa, there is reciprocity and universality 
between self and other. 
Because of phenomenon P2c, there is an imaginative transposal of self in to the 
position of the other, with respect to what appears for the other, as self imagines it to 
be for the other there. 
Because of phenomenon P2d, a third pairing occurs between the senses of self 
and other that are constituted by imaginative transposal. How the self empathically 
imagines the other to understand the cultural object, is added to the selfs sense of the 
world for the other and the Objectivity of the object. 
Phenomenon P5, the verification and nullification afforded, by everyday 
intersubjectivity provide the distinction that what is verified are the imaginatively 
transposed senses of presentiation constituted by self. P2d is sustained through further 
comparison and through a fourth pairing of senses. And so for the Objectivity of the 
object and understanding. 
Because of the prior phenomena, the everyday intersubjective life is intelligible 
because of the regular elucidations of possibility for the concrete lifeworld and its 
Objectivity identified above. Non-verbal interrelation of consciousness for the other, 
and the shared understanding of the human body, is the bedrock of transcendental 
intersubjectivity, the conditions for intersubjective-Objective meaning. 
Finally, each individual consciousness and person has a common understanding 
of the same cultural objects, Objectivity and world. It is claimed that the phenomena of 
intersubjectively understandable Objectivity, verbal communication and the socio- 
cultural and historically developing whole are understandable according to the 
conditions of possibility above. 
There are problems with the interpretation (section 8.1). The remainder of this 
section comments on the cohesiveness of the distinctions made in the Fifth Meditation 
with respect to the overall stance of transcendental phenomenology and its 
intersubjective idealism. The following remarks appraise the overall cohesiveness of 
Husserl's stance as it might be contradictory or between the distinctions he drew. The 
cohesiveness between distinctions is cross-referred according to numbering. As a first 
criticism here, it should be, noted that Husserl is positing that he has been able to 
identify non-self-sufficient moments of a whole that is self-sufficient. The manner of 
assessing the Fifth Meditation is to ask how well the phenomena and distinctions have 
52 
be shown in the text; and if the manner of interpretation is sufficient to catch the nature 
of the phenomenon of consciousness. The question of the success of this account is 
answered in the negative for reasons of a lack of adequate detail in the text. Supporting 
details may well be in the Husserliana volumes or the Nachlaß. The distinctions that 
Husserl made are now listed and questioned in turn. 
D1: Perceptual givenness and presentiated givenness are not the same. In 
connection with the `cognitive assumption' that consciousness constitutes all objects, 
both types of senses have been constituted by consciousness. But, it is not immediately 
apparent that presentiation is an appresentation or that presentiation is not the same as 
presentation, perception. When Husserl concluded that presentiation is "not inference, 
not a thinking act", (CM, §50, p 111/141), he argued for inherent reasoning to occur 
from out of the distinctions themselves and played down his own emphasis on the 
workings of the higher conscious processes that occur in interpreting such forms of 
meaning. Distinction D1 needs to be rethought. 
D2: Primal institution is the first-ever achievement of any sense of an object of 
any sort. But if the urstift is not experienced but forgotten and unobtainable, there is no 
account of how this type of distinction of the presence of the past in the present comes 
to be plausible within the Cartesian Meditations. Nor is there any account concerning 
how the first-ever achievement of the other gets up-dated throughout the lifespan in the 
text. The details of these important conclusions are simply omitted. Distinction D2 
needs further showing of its basis for it to pass. 
D3: The observably Identical referent means that specific noeses can be 
Identical also. In the case of the sense of the Identical senses of self and other (P5b), 
both these and their Identical difference are constituted by consciousness, following 
the `cognitive assumption'. It is assumed that there is constancy of self and other, and 
there is an intersubjective relation between them, of a particular type. This makes a 
paradoxical finding. Self and other are clearly not the same, but their intentional 
interrelatedness is such that they `face' each other. Distinction D3 implies that the 
whole already exists and has been at work prior to any turn to reflect on what appears 
for the ego. This is because if there is an Urstift of the other (D2), there has been an on- 
going whole of prior self-other experiences that has accrued over time. 
Another way of summarising this distinction is to state that all monads are 
intertwined and co-dependent on their empathic interconnectedness. This is backed up 
by: "Yet every consciousness of what is other, every mode of appearance of it, belongs 
53 
in the former sphere. Whatever he constitutes as non-other... is inseparable from his 
concrete being. The transcendental ego constitutes... the "Objective" world, as a 
universe of being that is other than himself 
- 
and 
... 
the other in the mode: alter ego", 
(§45, p 100/131). Yet the mode of givenness of the other person is achieved "in a 
manner that excludes an actually direct... showing of the predicates belonging to an 
animate organism... a showing of them in perception proper", (§50, p 110-1/140). For 
their consciousness never appears to self. Therefore, the private ego co-exists with the 
public merger. The major finding is "what is mine in my world-experience 
... 
my 
actual and possible experience of what is other, is wholly unaffected by screening off 
what is other", (§44, p 98/129). Husserl is making a paradoxical conclusion. "The 
paradox of human subjectivity: being a subject for the world and at the same time 
being an object in the world", (Crisis, §53, p 178/182). Like so many theories, 
idealisation takes place in order to explain what appears. For D3 to stand, it would be 
necessary to check with psychological reality in some way: Hence empirical 
psychology is required to respond to the conceptual claims of pure psychology. 
D4: The transcendental aesthetics of thing-constitution of the perceptual 
obiect, is the lowest form of the correlation in the recognition of the Identical 
perceptual object. On the contrary, it can be argued that the empathising of a human 
being is a much more complex sort that does not rely on the identification of an 
Identical thing or begin with the recognition of the other's body as a perceptual 
Korper. A human being appears as one instance of a highly variegated set of human 
beings, nothing like inanimate things. It might be better to argue that there are types of 
human expressiveness and that one person is acting like one of those types or 
employing one of a number of cultural forms. As it is presented in Meditations, D4 
cannot stand as it fails to attend to the pre-reflexive presence of meaning of the other 
and its contexts. 
D5: There is a first pairing between the three aspects of self. The self is 
reflected on from different perspectives. There is a question concerning the extent of 
pairing by association generally. In "the case of experiencing a physical thing 
... 
what 
is there perceptually motivates <belief in> something else being there too", (CM, §50, 
p 109-110/139). Readers are told that specific noeses correlate with specific types of 
objects. But there might be all manner of non-specifiable pairings occurring. Because 
of the overlapping nature of meanings; it is difficult to distinguish shades and nuances 
of non-verbal behaviour from its meaning. If we accept that the non-verbal meaning of 
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behaviour is posited as being the root of meaningfulness, it is the case that specific 
gestures, body positions and facial grimaces, taken as a whole, may mean something 
specific yet such meanings are not without ambiguity. There is scope for 
miscommunication in non-verbal behaviour as the type of signification is less precise 
than spoken language. D5 Cannot stand without further showing of its basis. 
D6: Self and other remain separate to each other, never having each other's 
consciousness first-hand. It is clear that the other is an intentional modification of self, 
and vice versa, the other's sense of their other, is a modification of their sense of self. 
Both are mutual and, simultaneously, ownness is comprised of my accumulated self, 
but linked to, and in contradistinction to the other, the current perceptual Körper and 
their actuality in a real context. It is unclear where these nested processes begin and 
end. The consequence is that there is difficulty in proving by showing, in Husserl's 
phenomenology. D6 can stand because the intersubjective connection does not include 
telepathy, which would take further careful work to delineate as a phenomenon. 
D7a: The sense of the other, constituted by empathic presentiation, is an 
intentional modification of the sense of self. A second pairing occurs between self and 
other. Husserl claimed that the first and second pairings must involve an urstift. But no 
sufficient account of its occurrence is given. It is entirely opaque to argue that it must 
happen, because nothing of the original object appears and it must be inferred or 
elucidated. One of the major principles Husserl held was that theoretical attention must 
be given to what appears. Yet presentiated senses quasi-appear and the meaning of the 
body of the other is immediately apparent. But to elucidate presentiated senses, that are 
no longer present, cannot be recollected and cannot be felt first-hand, is most difficult 
as they belong first-hand to the other, their motives and intentionality. Examples can 
be imagined and do not particularly help to set phenomenology on firm ground. 
Rather, such a procedure may help it stay within the limitations of the experience of 
one theoretician. This is perhaps why Marbach argues that pure psychology must turn 
to empirical psychology in order to look at exemplary'cases there. Something similar 
could be done in the case of psychotherapy. D7a cannot stand as it is worded because it 
does not include the sense of intersubjective responsiveness sufficiently. 
D7b: Vice versa, there is reciprocity and universality between self and other. 
When the elucidation of reciprocity and mutuality is further considered, it becomes 
difficult to know where to draw the line between the `cause' and `effect' between two 
instances of consciousness. Stated in another way, human intersubjectivity requires the 
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contributions of two or more persons and is not about the predictable effect of one 
person on the other. Indeed, human interaction cannot be viewed as the natural 
causation of one thing on another thing, without the possibility of it being otherwise. In 
intersubjectivity, in the phenomenological view, events could be otherwise as free will 
obtains. D7b can stand as an accurate account of intersubjectivity. 
D8a: There is an empathic imaginative transposal of self in to the perspective of 
the other, with respect to what appears for the other as self imagines it to be over 
there. Empathic presentiation of the other is when "I apperceive him as having spatial 
modes of appearance like those I should have if I should go over there and be where he 
is", (§54, p 117/146). Husserl asserted there is a potential interchangeability of 
perspectives in empathy, so much so that it could be referred to as a theory of `co- 
empathy' in that mutuality and reciprocity are included. There is not just a `one way' 
attention towards the other, or only one view of the world and its cultural objects. 
Therefore, Husserl's account warrants serious contemplation of the plurality of senses 
and perspectives that can arise about the same referent. The account `contains' 
relativism, so to speak, because it refers all possible perspectives to the absolutes of 
what appears for intersubjectively related instances of consciousness. This is born out 
by the treatment of relativism in The Crisis where this thesis concurs with the account 
provided by Soffer: "Husserl explicitly embraces a limited version of relativism... at 
the level of the concrete lifeworld". He did not abandon "the absolute, or the idea of 
philosophy as a foundational discipline capable of attaining this absolute (... as 
universal intersubjectivity)", (1991, p 143). Indeed, this thesis wholly agrees with 
Soffer that relativity and non-relativity exist in The Crisis: "Every people has its 
"logic" and, accordingly, if this logic is explicated in propositions, "its" a priori", (App 
VI, p 373/382). Husserl meant that common sense is relative to the specific 
intersubjective group that shows some constant, universal and ubiquitous parameters. 
As noted in Chapter 7, one moment of Husserl's argument rests on the truth of 
mutual reciprocity and mutual natures. The sense Leib, that one person adds to the 
other, is linked to prior empathising of what it would be like for oneself to be like the 
other, but `over There'. Thus, in transposal a regular set of empathically imagined 
senses is potentially created, based on the categories of Leib-Here and presentiated- 
Leib-There. On this basis, it is deemed possible that one can appreciate the points of 
view of others. Therefore, for Husserl, there is the eidetic possibility that the 
recognition of the other's perspective is possible through the capability of 
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interchanging ""from here"" with "corresponding to the change of position that puts 
me "there"", (CM, §53, p 116-7/146). If this were not true or faulty, then mutuality and 
reciprocity would fail. It would be more sobering perhaps, to consider those cases 
where mutual understanding fails and conflict arises rather than to only consider the 
optimistic view that agreement can occur. D8a can stand if it also includes the 
phenomena where there is failure or lack of clarity to understand the other. 
D8b: A third pairing occurs between the senses of self and other concerning 
what has been empathically imagined for the other. Husserl alleged that it is possible to 
verify the Identical self, other and their difference. What is referred to in this statement 
is the great mass of social reality and its action of verification or nullification in so 
supporting or disconfirming true belief. Given that there is so little concordance and 
agreement in history, between cultures, the genders and the races, there is doubt about 
how to include these aspects. But Husserl was focused on a most fundamental 
situation, deeper than mere agreement or disagreement. So D8b may pass as a 
possibility but would better to be rethought in relation to a wider account of 
intersubjective reality. 
D9: What is verified is the imaginatively transposed sense of the presentiation 
constituted by self. Everyday intersubjective life is intelligible because of the regular 
conditions of possibility identified above. This fourth pairing seals all the moments 
into a cohesive whole. But there is a significant problem with Husserl's wholistic 
stance. Husserl wrote that it is the universe of self, other, their difference, temporality 
and world-time form that together comprise the meaningfulness of world (§55, §56). 
The problem is that causation is implied: all the moments are necessary for the whole 
to be as it is. If one of the moments were absent or different, the explanation of its 
conditions would not be the same. Also circularity is present: The One World stance 
both plays a role in forming the solution and is proven as a result. D9 can stand as a 
possibility. Life is the teacher, if only we know how to learn from it. 
Husserl's concept of verification of otherness is related wholly to the constancy 
of identity and non-identity. Identities as sameness, and non-identity as difference, 
refer to judgements that obey some inferable rule about their degree of sufficient 
similarity or difference. From the point of view of one observer, difference might be 
present whilst another might see similarity. For there to be constancy of self and other, 
one that overcomes any temporary confluence or identification, in the context of 
lifelong social experience, verification has to overcome temporary mistakes. In order to 
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maintain the verification between self and other in society, requires there be a self- 
reflecting and self-correcting capacity, concerning how individuals maintain their own 
ego, over the lifespan, in relation to specific and general others. Without such abilities, 
Husserl's ideas about verification of otherness do not work. 
Consciousness and the intersubjective intentional implication between 
instances of consciousness are the fundament through which intersubjective Nature 
enables intersubjective Objectivity to occur in an intersubjective world. In other words, 
identity and difference of meaning, self and other are maintained whilst all moments of 
the whole contribute to the overall effect. Or in a different but equivalent language, the 
conditions for the intersubjective Objectivity of the world are the proclaimed result. 
It is quite comprehensible that, as a further consequence, an 
"empathizing" of definite contents belonging to the "higher psychic 
sphere" arises. Such contents too are indicated somatically and in the 
conduct of the organism toward the outside world 
- 
for example: as the 
outward conduct of someone who is angry or cheerful, which I easily 
understand from my own conduct under similar circumstances. Higher 
psychic occurrences, diverse as they are and familiar as they have 
become, have furthermore their style of synthetic interconnexions and 
take their course in forms of their own, which I can understand 
associatively on the basis of my empirical familiarity with the style of 
my own life, as exemplifying roughly differentiated typical forms. In 
this sphere, moreover, every successful understanding of what occurs in 
others has the effect of opening up new associations and new 
possibilities of understanding; and conversely, since every pairing 
association is reciprocal, every such understanding uncovers my own 
psychic life in its similarity and difference and, by bringing new 
features into prominence, makes it fruitful for new associations. 
§54, p 120/149. 
The case above specifically mentions the ability to understand another who is "angry 
or cheerful" and that specificity is the end product that occurs when all the moments 
(essences, a priori) conditions are in place. Husserl is concluding that the Objectivity of 
cultural objects, other persons and the world, is the result of these necessary moments 
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of the whole. This conclusion is vulnerable because of all the criticisms listed so far. 
The passage above could be read in many ways that would take phenomenology in 
other directions. 
D10: Through the nine prior distinctions of possibility, cultural objects have an 
intersubiectively understandable Objectivity. Empathic presentiation extends `through 
the other'. not just providing their sense but to providing the sense of the cultural 
object that others have. For Husserl and his structuralism, there is concordance between 
the immanent and transcendent correlations between consciousness and world, in 
forming a basis for higher, intersubjective intellectual and cultural structures. It is 
assumed that the Identical in the noema appears which indicates the eidetic structure of 
consciousness and the Identical form of the noeses involved. A good deal of 
idealisation and simplification has occurred in Husserl's account and major topics like 
naturalising, assuming cause and effect, not attending to correlation, not attending to 
the signifying practices of culture and society - etcetera - have occurred thus 
jeopardising the credibility of Husserl's analysis in Cartesian Meditations. However, 
as an account of the phenomena of the other, there is the `positive' or `optimistic' 
occurrence when we do accurately grasp what the other feels, thinks and experiences. 
Objects do exhibit cultural senses, as do persons. The accuracy of understanding 
though, is not guaranteed by a transcendental a priori account alone. Its function is to 
sketch out what might be possible through thought alone. 
2.2 Expert readings 
Since the publication of An Introduction to Husserlian Phenomenology by Bernet, 
Kern and Marbach in 1993, it would be impossible to ignore the interpretative help that 
Kern provides in clarifying the ambiguities in Cartesian Meditations. Kern explains 
that Husserl's original text contained a confused terminology, something that Husserl 
did not realise until shortly after completing the work (BKM, p 159). Kem notes that 
Husserl questioned the statements in Cartesian Meditations in several texts that are not 
yet published in English (p 261). Empathy is the constitutive synthesis involved in 
gaining everyday senses of others and One World, as it was in 1912 (Id III, Supp I). 
The analysis of presentiation is built on the model of perception (BKM, pp 141.154). 
The presentation corrects Husserl's own inaccuracy and thereby produces a reading of 
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the text more in league with the later writings of Husserliana XV that do not contain 
such confusions. 
There are only two really insightful discussions of the Fifth Cartesian 
Meditation by Kern (BKM, pp 154-165) and Ströker (1993). But even these are overly 
condensed and omit some of the steps and the overall significance of the work. Kern, 
writing in An Introduction points out the confusion concerns not sufficiently 
distinguishing that the reduction focuses on absolute consciousness (CM, §47, p 
104/135) and the best form of evidence (p 105/135). Kern points out that the 
equivalence between the own world, Eigenheitssphäre and the ursprüngliche welt or 
sphäre, is that they refer to absolute consciousness and pre-reflexive processes. 
However, there was a subtle difference for Husserl also discussed the role that 
Originalität or ursprünglichst evidence played. Absolute consciousness is that which 
has immediate pre-reflexive contact with the other. The ambiguity arises because the 
givenness of the other is by definition not that same type of givenness of self to self. 
Therefore, it is contradictory to claim that a pure ego contains within itself the source 
of all otherness. The further connection with the Leibnizian term "monad" is intended 
to mean that Husserl is considering general occurrences'. Kern points out that for 
Husserl, the monad, reduced absolute consciousness, is interdependent with the totality 
of all human beings, all consciousness. A single consciousness is not a self-sufficient 
whole (BKM, p 157-8). This is what is meant to be shown by the full reduction to the 
wholly genuine sphere of ownness, the pure own world of original givenness. 
Ströker makes it clear that the full transcendental reduction to absolute 
consciousness shows strongly that consciousness is intersubj ective, reciprocal and 
mutual (1993, p 136). She also emphasizes that in absolute consciousness, otherness is 
always already present (p 135). This is something of a paradoxical conclusion at the 
heart of transcendental phenomenology. She clarifies Husserl's analysis by pointing 
out that the role of the living body is a necessary constitutive condition in that it is 
engraved on absolute consciousness and the connection to retentional consciousness, 
through prior learning and association (p 137). The outcome for Husserl's analysis of 
' Leibniz defined the interrelationship between monads in the following way in section 
59 of the Monadology: "Now this connection or adaptation of all created things with 
each, and of each with all the rest, means that each simple substance has relations 
which express all the others, and that consequently it is a perpetual living mirror of the 
universe", (1714/1991). 
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public meaning is that the cultural world of the appresentation, of the cultural sense to 
the cultural object, is not achieved through the constitution of any one consciousness (p 
138). The meaning of this perspective is that all intersubjective meanings, be they 
empathic, cultural, scientific or philosophical, are enveloped in this one viewpoint and 
method of analysis. The tenor of the reduction to the pure own world is a temporary 
thought experiment that finds that there is an intersubjective source of mutual 
consciousness in oneself, as there must be, for all other consciousness (p 139). 
Ströker points out a shortcoming in Husserl's theorising (p 131). Namely, that 
he should have stayed with an attention to the expressiveness of the other's body. 
Thus, the semiotic remarks noted particularly in Ideas II (Supp VIII) and elsewhere, 
might be sufficient to portray more accurately the givenness of the other and then link 
self to other in a way that perhaps focuses on the links between gesture, speech and the 
empathic meaning of the other. Ströker notes that this would entail an exploration of 
bodily hermeneutics and the constitutive conditions for understanding mutuality, 
empathy, bodily-meaning and public meaning. Such an approach would pick up the 
lead made by Ideas III (§2) to begin a somatology of the living body as it indicates 
sense. 
Ströker does not like Husserl's attempt to consider the semiotic expressiveness 
of the body but wonders what he would have achieved if he had "proceeded otherwise 
than on the basis of a traditional, dualistic point of view", (1993, p 131). Husserl is 
further hampered by his acceptance of the Cartesian mind-body difference because it 
should "become clear that every synthesis of fulfillment that aims at the clarification of 
the sense of my transcendental ego leads back... to my bodiliness", (p 132). Ströker is 
correct to point out that Husserl held two opposing views: "he now sought on the one 
hand to dispel the illusion of solipsism... and on the other hand to broaden the absolute 
basis of judgement for my ego, so that this basis could become capable of supporting 
all those sense-bestowing achievements that are not in my power alone to perform", (p 
138). Ströker remarks that Husserl held two views. Namely, (1) that the ego is 
identically itself, and (2), that the ego is intersubjective, mutually and intentionally 
implicated with the other. "It is clear then that my empathy... is not sufficient... If I 
am to constitute others not merely as other subjects in the world but also as a 
transcendental egos like mine, then I can never attribute the constitution of myself to 
myself alone", (p 139-140). Husserl argued by the necessities of parts and wholes. 
Because it follows that real community is presupposed, there is a paradoxical finding, 
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"it can be posited and exhibited only in diverse theses that harmonize with each other, 
but that originate from different singular subjects, presupposes such an 
intersubjectivity", (p 142). "Thus there are greater and smaller, more specific and more 
general communities of subjects, together with their objective correlates, interwoven 
with each other in various ways, " a cultural or group intentional analysis discerning the 
intentional relations between specific people and their senses (p 143). Ströker remarks 
that the transcendental phenomenological picture of meaning constitution is more 
complex that the tripartite definition of it as ego, noesis and noema. The "very thought 
of an objectivity that could be constituted from the solipsistic standpoint would be 
absurd... What is objective... refers to other subjects outside of me", (p 142). 
Marbach provides some detailed background comments on the nature of the 
implication, or overlapping of cognitive processes, the one with the other (1993, p 85). 
He also focuses clearly on the One World thesis (p 91). He explains that Husserl 
believed that each consciousness is `split, ' in a non-pathological sense, because of 
pairing, the ego and empathy towards others. Marbach's clarification for reading the 
Meditations is not so much to discuss the givenness of the other, or the empathic 
presentiational synthesis, but to point out that sections 34 to 36 refer to the 
"parallelism" between pure psychology and transcendental phenomenology. 
Something which is not apparent in the text by itself (1994, p 197-8). In brief, Marbach 
emphasises that pure psychology is a natural attitude use of reflection and eidetics; 
whilst transcendental phenomenology is the full non-worldly procedure. But 
paradoxically, although transcendental phenomenology is the utmost primordial 
grounding, it is guided by pure psychology that comes first in exploring that ground. 
Three papers by Bernet provide some background information on Husserl's 
perspective in comparison to others writers. For instance, Bernet (1998a) compares 
peripheral topics to the Fifth Meditation mainly in comparison to Levinas. He also 
discusses empathy and transference by a comparison of Husserl, Freud and Derrida on 
the sense of the other (Bernet, 1993b). This latter paper is helpful in terms of showing 
some pertinent distinctions. It has to be noted that even in 1906 Husserl was busied 
with the nature of empathy and its connection to the ego, for all human beings (Bernet, 
1994a). From 1910 onwards, Husserl worked on "extending the transcendental 
reduction to intersubjectivity", (Hua XIII, No. 6, cited in BKM, p 154). In 1914, 
Husserl believed that empathy is only, possible by way of presentiating the other's 
"point of view", (Hua XdII, p 329, cited in BKNI, p 155). 
62 
Of the work of writers who are not Directors of the Husserl Archives, those 
whose comments are most agreeable in their accuracy to the texts include the 
following. Armstrong is one of the few writers to have understood the place of 
intersubjective intentional implication in Husserl's thought (1977, p 6). Armstrong is 
also correct in noting that perception, even of a simple object, involves and implies the 
empathic presence of others and their understandings (p 7). He agrees with Natanson 
(1973, p 32) and Gurwitsch on this central perspective (1974, p 231). 
Cairns (1976, p 102) is important in that he provided details of the reduction to 
the own world and spelled out its difference to the other types of reduction. The same 
set of interviews with Husserl and Fink provide details on what it means to analyze the 
transcendental ego (p 82-3). His criticisms of Husserl need careful consideration (1972, 
p 21, pp. 27-29). Embree (1992, pp 196-208) is one who follows Cairns in wanting to 
develop Husserlian reflection and focus more on the givenness of objects than on 
interpreting the intentional forms. In fact his 1997 paper demands criticism (p 289) to 
develop the work. Kersten (1973, p 135-143) makes critical comments which need 
attention and he seems to be a relevant player as he was an undergraduate student of 
Husserl. 
Generally, a sufficient background necessary to understand the Fifth Meditation 
has been supplied by the comments in the previous chapters on intentional implication, 
modification and explication. The Fifth Meditation also stands as part of an uneasy 
transition from Amsterdam Lectures (inaccurately recapped by Kocklemans, 1967, pp 
429-446) to Fink's Sixth Cartesian Meditation (CM VI, completed in 1932). The text 
of the Sixth Cartesian Meditation does not compare to the commentary given on the 
latter by Bernet (1994b) or by Fink in 1933 (1970) and later. It appears that the Sixth 
Meditation is a rough draft that was abandoned and represented Fink's own work. The 
marginalia by Husserl and his appendices frequently criticise Fink's approach. So, the 
Sixth Meditation cannot be used as a study to enhance understanding of Husserl's 
phenomenology. 
2.3 Faulty readings 
The rogues gallery of failing to attend to the text includes the following: Schütz 
(1966), Kocklemans (1994), Alweiss (1996,2003) and A. Smith (1997). However, it is 
not possible to enter further detailed criticism of the last two writers at this late stage. 
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First for censure is Schütz who, although in many ways a supporter and 
developer of Husserl's work, provided a seriously mistaken critical reading of the Fifth 
Meditation that has unfortunately upheld for many years (1966). Schütz was correct in 
noting that there is a two-step reduction (p 57). But shortly after this, he stated that it is 
impossible to perform the procedure (p 59). Schütz is incorrect to think that there are 
three egos in Husserlian phenomenology (Op cit) for there is only one sense of self, the 
natural attitude one that has different functions according to the perspective taken 
towards it. The on-looking part of consciousness, and the absolute consciousness, is 
not egos in the same sense at all. However, Schütz only provided general comments, 
that there are two appresentations of sense to the other. Firstly, the addition of a sense 
of lived bodiliness to the other. Then the other is seen as a co-existing ego in the mode 
of having the givenness `There' (p 64). This much is correct. 
Schütz then moved into a series of critical remarks concerning circularities that 
are presupposed in judging the senses of ownness and otherness in self. Such remarks 
are in direct contradiction to Husserl's principle of reduction, that it is not permissable 
to prejudge what is self and what is other, in the transcendental reduction (p 65-6). The 
comments are correct in so much that the manner in which such a judgement is made is 
intersubjective in origin, and that it is meant to be removed by the reduction. Insomuch 
that he is questioning the sense of intersubjectivity for Husserl, it seems that Schiltz 
has got a sufficient grasp on the subject and is stating that Husserl should have 
addressed communication between persons as well, rather than moving to consider 
some `wordless' and `culture-less' perspective (p 75-77). 
Unfortunately, Schütz concluded that solipsism arises when the natural attitude 
intersubjective set of meanings is rejected as a ground for phenomenology. This is 
obviously a fault for it at once ignores the sense of the transcendental reduction and 
secondly fails to address the main perspective of Husserl, that meaning is a public 
affair (p 91). Schütz claimed this final situation is due to the ontological mistakes of 
Husserl (p 87). Such a comment is entirely contradictory to his own initial opening 
statement that empathy makes possible reciprocal understanding within a human 
community (p 52). Therefore, the comments of Schütz are garbled although he made 
pertinent criticisms on circularity in the method and reasoning of Husserl. Schütz did 
not understand that there are two absolutes in Husserl's thought (p 167). 
Gorner supports the reading of the Fifth Meditation as the work of Husserl-the- 
solipsist but provides some condensed and useful points in terms of emphasizing how 
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there is a double action of the transcendental reduction (1976, p 61, citing Hua XIII, p 
189). He clarifies the processes that are involved in creating the understanding of the 
other as a person, `like me', with a personal perspective of their own. Gorner also 
confirms that the reduction produces an understanding of objects for consciousness, as 
appearing with a reference to other persons (p 60). Similarly, work by Crossley (1996) 
is part of social psychology and reads the Fifth Meditation as a confused failure to 
attend to intersubjectivity in an adequate way. This is part of the mis-information effect 
that 
- 
abounds in understanding empathy and intersubjectivity in the secondary 
literature. 
Elliston provides good details of the peculiar reduction (1977, p 217) and he 
notes that objectivity is there for all (p 213). Elliston remarks correctly that at the time 
of writing, Husserl believed that all phenomenological answers were to be found in the 
Eigenheitssphdre and he provides plenty of details about what appears after the full 
reduction (p 219, cf CM, §44, §45). Elliston is also correct in naming sections 52 to 54 
as the foundation for the analysis of all intersubjective experience and knowledge, and 
that it involves "intentional overreaching", (1977, p 223-4). Elliston also sides with 
Schütz in wondering what happens to natural language and meaning, for transcendental 
phenomenologists. Elliston has difficulty in accepting the tenet that the natural attitude 
can still be analyzed, by or within, the transcendental one (p 227). So Elliston's paper 
is of good quality in mentioning these major themes. Cunningham (1976) misses the 
point generally about the tensions and inadequacies of Husserl's approach. Costelloe 
(1998) does not achieve much insight in understanding Schutz's picture of Husserl. 
Ricoeur provides general introductory comments on the Meditations as a whole 
(1967). His comments are insufficient and do not take the reader to a deep level of 
understanding similar to that which is provided by Ströker and Kern. Ricoeur is quite 
correct to note that simultaneously, the other is constituted in me and that the other is 
constituted as other, different to self (p 116). He is correct in stating that both self and 
the other belong to each other's world of experience, and that this one world is 
accessible to all persons (p 117). He is helpful in pointing out that several of the 
sections of the Fifth Meditation can be read together, and that Husserl was providing a 
progression which ascends from the most fundamental to the highest, cultural senses. 
Although many details of the alleged cognitive process are mentioned, the amount of 
detail provided is not sufficient in comparison to Kern's presentation (BKM, p 156). 
Merleau-Ponty remarked that reflection is necessary, despite his other comments on its 
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inability to be one that wholly displays everything that the thinker wants to know. We 
should not be drawn away from reflection but need to focus on "the basic operation 
which infuses meaning (sens) into the sensible, and which is taken for granted by any 
logical mediation or any psychological causality", (1964, p 34). 
As regards the remainder of the English language literature on the Fifth 
Meditation, comments are required on work from the following persons. Welton 
provides useful snippets from the Husserliana series on Husserl's own immediate 
disappointment with Cartesian Meditations and provides a sketch of how Husserl 
worked to further clarify his position (2000, pp 129,133-8,148,150,155,222). The 
general tenor of these remarks is to further stress intersubj ectivity. Strasser agrees that 
immediately after sending the typescript of the Meditations to the translators, Husserl 
no longer liked his work (1976, p 15). 
Kocklemans is correct to understand the reduction to the own world as a 
reduction to non-verbal experience (1994, p 283) although the overall standard of his 
work is poor. Steinbock is correct to quote Husserliana XIII that shows the primacy of 
empathy (1995, p 53) and he correctly notes that speech has been omitted in the 
particular case of the Fifth Meditation (p 74). Some insightful comments on 
association in Ideas II and the Meditations are found in Lauer (1967, p 173). He is 
correct to note the central role of association between one's own Seele and Leib and to 
note the appresentation of this sense of unity to the other. Husserl believed that the 
presentiated or mediated sense of the other is supported by the first-ever achievement 
of the pair, self and other. Lauer spots that the Kulturwelt is the basis of the 
intersubjective a priori conditions for the existence of the shared world (CM, §61, 
§62). His comments (1967, p 169) are very much like those of Ricoeur (1967, p 117) 
and Elliston (1977, p 217). Elliston is correct to note layers of constitution of the sense 
other in the Fifth Meditation but he does not go as far as working out the universal 
essence of empathic presentiation. 
Downes makes an introductory comparison to treatments of the problem of 
other minds (1965, p 253). Downes is noteworthy in that he also realises the centrality 
of the One World thesis (p 258) and he is able to realise that there is something of a 
contradiction between alleging that the on-looking part of consciousness is able to 
generalise its perspective to such a degree that it is able to take up a position of looking 
with `anybody-ness' and not `somebody-ness' (p 257). The Fifth Meditation could be 
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read as an answer to the problem of other minds but its form of analysis circumvents 
`the problem' as did Heidegger. 
Lambert correctly ascertains that the full reduction is meant to remove all 
senses of intersubjectivity (1975, p 45). Yet Husserl's argument rests on the ability to 
judge the sense of one's ownness as being different from the sense of the other's 
givenness (p 47). Lambert makes a number of objections to Husserl's approach on the 
grounds that assumptions without evidence, let alone phenomenological evidence, are 
being made. For instance, Husserl assumed that one's own experience of Leib is like 
that of all other persons. This is particularly strange when the first hand, living, bodily 
senses of other persons are unavailable to self (p 49). 
Smillie provides an interesting perspective insomuch that his comments lend 
themselves to a semiotic reading of the expressiveness of the connection between the 
Körper and Leib (1971, p 65). However, there is an over-strong emphasis on the role of 
the motivating understanding of the other, as having a living body like mine. This does 
not account for the first-ever occurrence of empathy that happens in infancy. But, 
Smillie is quite correct to note the shortcoming that whilst infants are turned towards 
the other, there is no way of being able to see their own face (p 67). However, the 
emphasis on argument by analogy is misplaced (Ströker, 1993, pp 130-131). Husserl's 
argument is much greater than just focusing on the nature of the feedback and 
connection between two types of expressive sign, between the unity of self and that of 
the other. 
Further French writers need to be mentioned for their comments on the other 
have relevance for understanding the different readings of the same situation. The 
phenomenological movement as a whole influenced continental thinking about the 
nature of the other. Notable contributions have been made by Heidegger (Chapter 9), 
Sartre (1943/1958, Appendix 1.2), Merleau-Ponty (1945/1962, Appendix 1.2), Levinas 
(1947/1986,1963/1987) and Lacan (1954/1978, Appendix 3.3). But a full discussion 
of these developments would take us far away from what the function of this account 
should be for the thesis. Please allow the following remarks to suffice. 
Merleau-Ponty's position on empathy and intersubjectivity followed the 
comments of Ideas II (§21, p 101/95) and discussed "co-functioning" and 
"intercorporeality". Merleau-Ponty wrote: "We function as one unique body", (1968, p 
215). "There is not the For Itself and the For the Other. They are each the other side of 
the Other. This is why they incorporate one another: projection-introjection", (p 263). 
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Merleau-Ponty accepted Husserl's position on presentiation and the givenness of the 
other. To accept this position means to agree with the claim that the sense of the other 
in the natural level is the production of a connection between self, other and the totality 
of social life. The sense of the other is a mirage because each consciousness puts it 
There, in the place of the other, and does so in a regular way. Projections, retentions 
and anticipations are in an interplay that continues to attain a sense of others as the 
basis for all public meaning. 
Of the remainder of English language works on the Fifth Meditation, 
background comments have been provided by Hall (1979) who makes generally 
correct comments without making any piercing insight. Embree remarks on Husserl's 
paradoxical findings (1997). Spiegelberg has a paper that suggests the possibility of a 
generally phenomenological-subjective type of analysis, in imagining what it is like to 
be another person (1980). This transposal approach is distinguished from empathy 
proper. What Spiegelberg is discussing is what it is like to move about in another 
person's world. Not much help can be gained from Stein's doctoral thesis that is not 
precise in laying out the method or the problem at hand (1989). Other background 
material is provided by Owens (1970) in a general piece on intersubjectivity. 
Some further contributions on Meditations are made by Attig and Spiegelberg 
(1976) who discuss apodicticity incorrectly. It was not achieved at the time of writing 
but was an aim. Tripathy (1992) is generally inaccurate about the Meditations. Embree 
(1997) notes that the reduction to the sphere of ownness is also contradictory in that it 
is not possible to remove the natural attitude. He notes that the Fifth Meditation is an 
argument by logic. There are indeed confusions between the constituted and the 
constituting (p 289). Hall (1979) notes the tension between reducing to a sphere of 
ownness that correctly knows the whole world (p 15) but he does not note the 
`contradiction' of having empathy within a sphere of ownness (cf CM, §44, p 99/129- 
130). Williams (1989) is an acceptable introductory work. Husserl's image of human 
beings is discussed by Stack (1974). There is a general discussion of empathy by Bello 
(1977) and other introductory remarks by Arp (1993). Lacklustre contributions to the 
literature have also been provided by Boehm (1970), Cobb-Stevens (1983), K. 
Hartmann (1985), Maloney (1986), Bostar (1987), Mishara (1994), Tharakan (1998) 
and Carr (1973, p 32-5,1999). 
Some poor papers and books have been contributed by the following persons 
and are mentioned here for the sake of completion rather than edification. The work of 
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Kocklemans (1967) is lacklustre in comparison to those contributions noted above. 
Kocklemans fails to provide an analysis that goes into sufficient detail (1987). A paper 
by Marsh is noteworthy for being published at all because of its gross inaccuracy in 
asserting that one's own Leib is removed by the reduction (1979, p 463, cf CM, §44, p 
98/129). Such a mistake indicates the poor state of play in the general knowledge of 
Husserl's work. A paper by Zahavi entitled "Husserl's intersubjective transformation 
of transcendental philosophy" is misleading because the body of the work is very far 
from the stated aim (1996). The paper jumps around a number of subjects without 
making any specific points or showing Husserl's development of Kant or response to 
Hegel. 
Haney's book on the Cartesian Meditations is inaccurate (1994). She interprets 
the transcendental reduction as removing all conceptualising ability from the on-looker 
part of consciousness. She writes that a "pre-linguistic, pre-empathetic ego cannot" 
describe itself. "The primordial ego cannot speak; the solipsistic ego does not cognize 
the phenomenon of the other; the mundane ego labels the natural, everyday ego which 
constitutes itself and others as mutual reciprocal subjects/objects in the shared, 
intersubjective world", (p 31). Such notions are completely foreign to the text that 
states quite clearly that there is no such thing as a pure ego without a sense of the other. 
A further problem arises later, where Haney believes that argument by analogy is 
taking place (p 119-120). Obviously, this is not. the case as Ströker points out (1993, p 
130). Consequently, when Haney states it again, the same point needs to be ignored 
(1986, p 146,1997). 
As a closing comment on The Fifth Meditation, it has to be noted with respect 
to Levinas, that Husserl took an epistemological and not an ethical approach to 
intersubjectivity on the occasion of writing the Meditations and in some other texts, 
but the Kaizo papers are evidence to show how ethics were included during the years 
of writing and teaching (cited in Welton, 2000, p 260, pp 306-327). 
2.4 The difference between adequate and inadequate readings 
To focus on the nature of the conditions of intersubjectivity, as Husserl did, is to 
compare and contrast manners of givenness that comprise the whole of meaning as 
publicly situated and open to be understood by any person in anyway. But there are 
rational limits of specific, necessary conditions of thought. The accessibility of the 
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human world to the meanings of others and the real physicality of material and bodily 
being is constrained by prior understanding. An approach that focused on the manner 
of relatedness, could move toward ethics and epistemology or any inclusion of 
important topics and still remain a phenomenology, as long as it keeps the myriad of 
worthwhile distinctions actually made by Husserl over the years of writing. 
Ultimately, the state of pure psychology in relation to transcendental 
phenomenology in the Crisis is that pure psychology is abandoned as a mistaken but 
useful, introductory phase in the development of transcendental phenomenology. 
Empathy and intersubjectivity are the most central topics, rather than a focus solely on 
the lifeworld that is multifaceted. There is a large body of works on Crisis that include 
noteworthy items from Ströker (1980) and Scanlon (1992). One way of considering the 
Crisis is to think of it as a defence against not being able to admit the mistake of 
ignoring Heidegger's ontological and hermeneutic themes. 
Both Husserl and Heidegger are guilty of hubris in claiming that their positions 
are absolute ones. Husserl seemed unable to bring himself to give any concessions 
concerning hermeneutics to Heidegger and dug himself further into an entrenched 
position as regards transcendental phenomenology. Any possibility of a rapprochement 
with Heidegger is omitted to save his own project of transcendental phenomenology. 
The lines toward the other opened up by section 45 of Phenomenological Psychology, 
or the analysis of the expressive body in Ideas II, are not followed through by Husserl. 
If Husserl had accepted Heidegger's criticisms gracefully or re-opened the semiotic 
path that was so clear in 1914 (Bernet, 1988, Ströker, 1993, p 131), this direction might 
have opened up new avenues of thought that could have showed the reliance of 
Heidegger's work on Husserl's. Instead, it seems that Husserl chose to ignore 
Heidegger's position except for the 1931 critique (1997b) and for those remarks that 
insist that transcendental phenomenology of history is the only true path for all 
philosophy and the sciences, the dream was not over (Crisis, App IX, p 391/510). 
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Appendix 3 
Heidegger's challenge and the other in psychotherapy 
Aim: This Appendix provides material related to the psychotherapy literature and 
practice. Further affirmation of the genuine matter and style of phenomenology need to 
be opposed to inaccurate study and commentary. Heidegger's work and manner of 
writing must come for critique in comparison to the Kern and Marbach school of 
interpretation. A number of themes are covered below and should be understood as the 
discussion of matters that are parallel concerns of the main text. Some brief comments 
are made about Daseinsanalysis, the only explicitly Heidegger-influenced therapy. But 
a sustained emphasis on Daseinsanalysis would detract from the aim of the thesis that 
is to focus on the other as a whole, comprised of developmental and social 
understanding that enables therapists to meet with clients in an adequate manner. 
3.1 Heidegger's mistreatment of phenomenology in History of the Concept of Time 
Heidegger is generally understood as the most serious opponent of the Husserlian 
attention the `superficiality' of consciousness. The thesis has opposed Heidegger's 
influence, in to re-writing Freud's psycho-analysis by Boss and has showed how there 
is a richer vein of critique and development by way of Husserl. But something needs to 
be shown about how at fault Heidegger was in his critique of Husserl. Two specific 
shortcomings of Heidegger's stance can be traced back to the 1924 lecture course 
published as the History of the Concept of Time. 
" 
Firstly, Heidegger did not treat intentionality as intentionality but obscured Husserl's 
clear comments in Ideas I on intentional implication and modification and turned away 
from the phenomena to Greek philosophy. Specifically, he turned away from the 
phenomena of the different types of givenness and abandoned a possible critique and 
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development of the investigation of noesis-noema correlates and Husserl's hermeneutic 
stance with respect to how different types of objects appear. 
" 
Secondly, in History of the Concept of Time Husserl's phenomenology is defined 
without mentioning the major focus on the intentional analysis of noeses and what that 
means (for instance Id I, §99, §111). It is not clear whether this is a purposeful mis- 
representation of Husserl's case or not. However, Heidegger's critique of Husserl made 
Heidegger's phenomenology into an object-related study in the context of ancient 
Greek philosophy rather than the relation of the being of Da-sein to the being of what 
exists and how it exists, for Da-sein. 
Heidegger's critique of Husserl in History of the Concept of Time can be 
summed up as follows: 
" 
Nature and consciousness are two ontic occurrences; whereas Being is the first 
phenomenon, following Aristotle. Being is the ground to be understood 
phenomenologically with the Being of the intentional, consciousness or Da-sein, as the 
first port of call: The monumental accusation put to Husserl is that he entirely evaded 
the call to understand the question of the Being of consciousness: "Husserl's primary 
question is simply not concerned with the character of the being of consciousness", 
(HCT, §l ld, p 107/146-8). And further, "the question of the being of the intentional is 
left undiscussed", (§12, p 113/157). Leading to the conclusion: "Not only is the being 
of the intentional... left undetermined, but categorially primal separations in the entity 
(consciousness and reality) are presented without clarifying or even questioning the 
guiding regard", (§13f, p 128-9/178). The phenomena of the Being of self and other is 
described as even "Dasein's being-alone is a being-with in the world. Being-alone is 
only a deficiency of being with 
- 
the other is absent 
- 
which points directly to the 
positive character of being-with", (§26a, p 238/328). Da-sein should be understood in a 
double sense: "first, that of the entity which is to give the sense of being originally and 
authentically; and the other is the determination of the right sort of access to the entity 
in order to bring out the sense of being", (§ 16, p 146/195-6). 
" 
Heidegger claimed that Husserl naturalised intentionality because he kept the 
separation between subject and object rather than overcoming it: It is claimed that 
Husserl's approach is no improvement over the natural attitude. The accusation is that 
the initial assumption, that meaning and being exist for consciousness, is named as a 
presupposition and so stated as being-out of court: For "absolute being 
- 
... 
does not 
determine the entity itself in its being but rather sets the region of consciousness within 
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the order of constitution and assigns to it in this order a formal role of being earlier 
than anything objective... Thus this determination of being is also not an original one", 
(HCT, §11c, p 105-6/145). The point is that Husserl is meant to be idealising 
consciousness rather than attending to it as a phenomenon in the world: "The 
elaboration of pure consciousness as the thematic field of phenomenology is not 
derived phenomenologically by going back to the matters themselves but by going back 
to a traditional idea of philosophy", (§lld, p 107/147). For this criticism to stand it 
would have to be the case that Heidegger had circumvented the whole influence of the 
history of philosophy and gone further toward the nature of intentionality in the world 
prior any hermeneutic bias distorting his view. Clearly, he preferred argument 
according to the pre-Socratics. 
Heidegger's hermeneutic strategy can be summed up as follows: 
" 
There is a move to hermeneutics as referentiality' in the more all-encompassing 
horizon of historically-inspired retrievals of meaning: "When we ask about the sense of 
being, then being, which is to be determined, is in a certain way already understood... 
a wholly indeterminate preunderstanding... whose character can however be 
phenomenologically understood", (§15, p 143/193). 
" Reductions of a different type show horizons for understanding of the sense of the 
being who understands beings of different sorts. For instance, Da-sein is the only being 
who understands self and non-self being and beings. Da-sein has a world. Animals 
have a sort-of world. Primitive Da-sein has an animistic world. Non-Da-sein being 
does not have a world. 
" Kant's a priori is taken to the horizon of Da-sein's temporality as a finite mortality 
and comparative history. What is required is a return as a "genuine repetition, " a 
"return 
... 
that goes back prior to the questions which were posed in history, and the 
questions raised by the past are once again originally appropriated... the repetition 
... 
must bring us to understand that the Greek formulation of the question was conditioned 
and provisional and... had to be so", (§14a, p 138/188). On the one hand, Heidegger 
clearly preferred the Greek conception and yet he also held that: "The more originally 
and the less prejudicially the elaboration of what is put into pre-view is brought about, 
the less one uses fortuitous, seemingly self-evident and worn-out concepts which are 
More about hermeneutics in Chapter 9 (cf BT, §§ 16,17,31-3,76). 
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clear in their origin, then all the more surely will concrete research into being attain its 
ground and stay rooted in its native soil", (§32, p 306-7/423). The point is that this 
passage does not make it clear that the majority of Heidegger's philosophical work 
exists as historical comparison where the earliest Greek philosophers are valued time 
and again over contemporary ideas. 
The argument between Husserl and Heidegger is about what is valued as the 
genuine manner of attending to the pristine phenomena of intentionality in its genuine 
contexts of others, culture, philosophy natural science and history. From Husserl's 
perspective, Heidegger was wrong to prefer empty philosophising over an attention to 
the phenomena. Despite his pertinent hermeneutic criticisms, Heidegger did not do 
intentional analysis but made historical comparisons in works like Being and Time and 
the Zollikon Seminars. Heidegger's criticisms fall flat because he cuts out 
intentionality from his analysis. Of course consciousness does not appear directly but it 
does appear through the givenness of any object through one's own actions. The 
phenomenology of the intentionality of noesis-noema correlations and implications 
beats the phenomenology of being-in-the-world and Da-sein devoid of intentionality. 
To summarise, a discourse about being does not help because it is an analytic 
reading of human being that ignores intentionality and shared meaning in favour of 
history. Although history is important it is not as important as understanding 
psychological meaningfulness and meta-representing the shared relationship with 
others. History of the Concept of Time is a particular case where Heidegger refused to 
attend to intentionality and possibly purposefully misrepresented Husserl's turn to 
consciousness, whilst turning his work to non-sensible Being. When taken to 
psychology or therapy, the basic stuff of affect, the presence of the past as personal 
history, suffering,. cause and `causes, ' habits of all kinds 
- 
are the basic material that 
needs to be understood. 
Similarly, the influence from 1924 is taken forward into Being and Time. Many 
interpretations of Being and Time are simply inappropriate because they do not 
understand Husserl's phenomenology and therefore cannot see how Heidegger placed 
his work with respect to the Logical Investigations, Time, Philosophy as Rigorous 
Science and Ideas H. Like Husserl, Heidegger worked to replace `bad naturalism' with 
`good phenomenology'. Heidegger provided a hurried sketch in Division One that is a 
blur of concepts that do not begin to make a focus until section 69 and Division Two. 
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However, Division Two is more unclear than the first. 
Unfortunately, some of the major commentators on Heidegger who have the 
greatest familiarity with his work are not translated into English. There are some 
notable exceptions including a short paper from Dastur (1996), Gadamer (1975) and 
Bernet (1994a, 1994b). The reading of Being and Time here is influenced by seeing the 
work as a response to Husserl (among many others) and a critique and development of 
his position. Lambert (1975) makes a correct comparison to Being and Time where 
Heidegger wrote that the other is encountered "from out of the world", (BT, §26, p 
112/119, where the world is the basis of the understanding of the phenomenologically 
"secured problematic", §43a, p 192/207). Other sound contributions that have 
accurately sketched the major themes of Being and Time. A deficient interpretation of 
Heidegger is provided in the doctoral dissertation by Willbourn (1997). 
The core image of Being and Time (§ § 17,18), which is that of the semiotics of 
immediate understanding in relation to temporality (§69). The referentiality and 
semiosis through which things, persons and the gestures and speech of persons, make 
sense within the horizon of the world, is a temporal occurrence. 
Heidegger was capable of clear writing and presentations of his thought (1997). 
However, in Being and Time, he chose not to be clear and provides readers with an 
exercise in style. It becomes necessary to read in between the lines, as well as along 
them, in order to work out what he had to say, such is the multiplicity of meanings that 
he called forth. With reference to Heidegger's disconsolate remarks at the end of Being 
and Time (§83), it seems that he is unhappy with his analysis, although it is not clear 
why. Possibly, this is because there is no balancing up of the clear emphasis for the 
influence of the past in Division One and the less clear emphasis on the future in 
Division Two, for instance. The major figure of the hermeneutic circle in Division One 
refers to the influence of past knowledge, or better, pre-reflexive understanding in Da- 
sein's being. It is the influence of the presence of the past, in the present, for the future. 
Heidegger's writing in Being and Time is polythetic. It traverses a number of 
introductory distinctions, beire heading off on a new tack. Thus, it provides a 
movement of continuing clarification. It establishes a distinction early on, and then 
abandons it for a new term. The experience of reading Being and Time is similar for 
the struggle clarity itself. Being and Time is as though Heidegger purposefully wished 
to defy clarity for the sake of making the reader work at making the text meaningful. 
Reading Being and Time is a lesson in artful hesitation and delayed gratification. 
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The Husserl-Heidegger comparative literature has useful contributions from F. 
Smith (1970), Hopkins (1993), Stapleton (1983a, 1983b), Moran (2000a) and Maloney 
(1986). Other analyses of Husserl's approach to meta-phenomenology come from 
Fink's Sixth Cartesian Meditation (1995), Prufer (1992) and Mirvish (1995), which are 
comparable to Heidegger's comments. 
In comparison, it can be seen that for Heidegger, the method of phenomenology 
is developed through a preparatory procedure of finding the horizon of Da-sein's 
temporal being (BT, §5, p 15/17). The same investigation is repeated through 
increasingly more concrete and intricate analyses, by the `description' of a selection of 
primordial existentials of the ontological horizon of the world, meaning and 
temporality (§§69b-83). Some themes within the introductory sections of Being and 
Time provide clues to the most constitutive of Da-sein's being-structures. One clue is 
the heading of Part One. The heading states the overall aim of Being and Time: "The 
Interpretation of Da-sein in Terms of Temporality [Zeitlichkeit] and the Explication of 
Time as the Transcendental Horizon of the Question of Being", (p viii). From this 
remark we would expect to see Heidegger developing Husserl's eidetic analysis of the 
temporal structure of consciousness. During the Introduction (§ § 1-6) we read that Da- 
sein's being is Sorge and that this is related to temporality in some way (§5, p 15/17, 
§8, p 35/39). Again, readers are given a glimpse of something of the overall project. 
Section eight warns, for instance, that the whole of Division Two is only an initial 
starting point, sufficient to sketch out a basis from which to ask questions about being 
overall or make explicit the relation of the Temporalitkt des Seins to the Zeitlichkeit of 
Da-seine. A clue to this Zeitlichkeit is gained from the nature of its being-in-the-world, 
a form of being who transcends (§7c, p 34/38), reaches out and beyond itself, in such a 
manner as to incorporate the Being of other beings and being overall itself. But when 
so much of Being and Time is vague with respect to a formulation of the precise details 
of how temporality and the transcendence of the world fit together, it can be concluded 
that there is a fair amount of inconclusiveness for any interpretation. 
2 It would go beyond the current scope of this work to compare and contrast Husserl 
and Heidegger's positions on temporality. To undertake such a task would mean 
working through all of Heidegger's output from about 1919 to 1934 and comparing it 
to Husserl's writing on temporality during the same period. In short, the two 
perspectives are quite similar, although both writers are neither clear nor coherent in 
the statements they make, even within the same text (Dastur, 1996). Heidegger's 
position on original Zeit is almost the same as Husserl's. 
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Heidegger's claims are only the understandings derived by a single author. 
However, in terms of discussing pre-reflexive understanding in the passive voice, then 
this would be acceptable if it were explained (cf §32, p 140-141/150). The question of 
consciousness, and active and passive process, are ignored in favour of a discourse 
concerning the temporal openness or clearing of Da-sein's being. There is no 
rapprochement from Heidegger towards Husserl's stance which is criticized, 
misrepresented and ignored. Consequently, the position of Being and Time is that all 
understanding of being appears in the clearing of Da-sein's temporal being, yet the 
manner in which Da-sein becomes aware is relegated to a mere superficiality in 
comparison to the fundamentality of the manner of its being. 
3.2 Criticisms of the stance towards the other in section 26 of Being and Time 
Something like a reply to Hegel is found in Being and Time, section 26. Heidegger 
claimed that all forms of surface relating are caused by being-with and are identifiable 
as types between two extreme modes, of either inauthentic leaping in for the other; or 
authentic leaping ahead for them. The first sort, leaping in, is patronising, dis- 
empowering, dominating and controlling the other. Even if such attempts are subtle 
and unobtrusive or tacit and unnoticed. In this case, Da-sein forces itself on the other 
and dictates to them what they will concern themselves with: "In this concern, the 
other can become one who is dependent and dominated even if this domination is a 
tacit one and remains hidden from him", (§26, p 114/122). It is a deficient mode of 
being particularly occurring in the attitude of everyday, fallen Da-sein. Heidegger 
listed some of its shortcomings as ambiguity and jealousy, chattering and fraternising 
and satisfying the requirements of the they. The opposite direction is to become 
resolute and to leap head in comradeship: "Resolute Da-sein can become the 
"conscience" of others. It is from the authentic being a self of resoluteness that 
authentic being-with-one-another first arises, not from ambiguous and jealous 
stipulations and talkative fraternizing in the they and in what they wants to undertake", 
(§60, p 274/298). 
The other end of the continuum is a positive and restorative mode of being-with 
of leaping ahead, where the other is given back their care, Sorge, returning them for the 
burden and exercise of choosing their own individual possibilities. Leaping ahead is an 
empowering form of concern that helps other Da-sein because it "pertains to authentic 
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care; that is, the existence of the other, and not to a what which it takes care of, helps 
the other to become transparent to himself in his care and free for it" as self-possessed 
(§26, p 115/122). This freeing of the other occurs within "authentic being a self of 
resoluteness", (§60, p 274/298). Indeed, an "authentic alliance" is co-operative work 
on the same project' (§26, p 115/122). In terms of the possibility of co-operation 
between two or more Da-sein, there is the possibility that persons can work towards the 
same goal according to the way each participant has ` taken hold' of their own being, in 
how they concern themselves in their possibilities towards others: in their attitudes 
towards others. 
For instance, Fürsorge includes sharing food, the style of clothing and nursing 
(p 114/121). But all such mentions only show Da-sein's Being and must not be read as 
psychology. Such an analysis of codes of clothing, forms of caring for others and the 
types of sharing food are not entered into but would indicate a more semiotic style of 
analysis of actual instances of Da-sein of the type following what is begun by the 
remarks on leaping in and leaping ahead (p 114/122). Such an analysis would be 
focused on the power dynamic between cases of dominance, robbing the other of their 
burdens and responsibilities; versus freeing the other, being tolerant and considerate. 
But the brief sketch provided raises the question of the many themes that could be 
included in an analysis of the ontological structures of intersubjective praxis. From 
section 26, four sets of themes need to be acknowledged and noted as the full context 
for such an analysis of being-with, yet they cannot possibly be explored here in a full 
account of what they might entail. These are the themes of (1) power and self- 
responsibility; (2) the individual and the collective; (3) authentic and inauthentic; and 
(4) the associated analysis of Da-sein's being-with as alienated; fallen, thrown and so 
forth (§27). 
It is possible that Heidegger is suggesting that a politics or an ethics would be 
forthcoming. Heidegger stated a case for establishing a social history of oppression and 
liberation, slavery and freedom or formulating a `group analysis' of such current power 
dynamics in a more applied style. This type of analysis can be found in feminism, 
Foucault and social history. Another possibility for understanding how Heidegger's 
thoughts can be applied ontically is that the type of Being of others can be seen in their 
3 Psychotherapy has adopted the same term "alliance" to characterise the type of 
therapeutic relationships it would like to make with clients. 
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actions and mistakes, and it is revealed in its assumptions when they project their 
world and their preconceptions. But the situations addressed by the terms leaping in 
and leaping ahead are only a small choice among many intersubjective possibilities. 
3.3 On psychotherapy from a phenomenological standpoint 
Although many psychotherapists have taken the word "phenomenology" to try and 
explore or inspire how they work and think, the vast majority of these enterprises in 
thought fall far short of what Husserl and Heidegger actually discussed. The attempts 
at explanations by Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Ricoeur and Levinas have not helped in 
delineating the original concerns. 
Jaspers created his own phenomenological descriptions of the experiences of 
people with psychiatric disorders and this is a potentially fruitful and necessary line for 
phenomenology to pursue. Consequently, his approach is not Husserlian interpretation 
of mental processes but it is interesting. Jaspers' comments on the hermeneutic circle 
in the General Psychopathology emphasised the continual possibility of the re- 
contextualisation of any interpretation. It is worth noting his hermeneutic stance 
because it was a precursor to Heidegger. Jaspers asserted six principles that are 
interlocking, if not repetitive. 
a) Understanding "meaning demands other methods than those of the natural sciences", 
(1963, p 355). All "empirical understanding is an interpretation: " Therefore, 
hermeneutics is ubiquitous (p 357). 
b) The whole contextualises each of its non-self-sufficient moments: "Understanding 
therefore will push on from the isolated particular to the whole and it is only in the 
light of the whole that the isolated particular reveals its wealth of concrete 
implications", (p 356-7). 
c) The hermeneut should not decide on any specific understanding too hastily. 
Ambiguity is a phenomenon that needs addressing. Human being contains such 
ambiguities and contradictions. "We should always look out for possible ambiguities", 
(Op cit). 
d) Hermeneutic re-interpretability is forever open and not capable of being closed: "all 
phenomena are open to unlimited interpretation and reinterpretation", (p 356). 
Therefore, understanding is inconclusive because. of hermeneutic re-interpretability. 
Predictions and hypothesis testing lie outside of the sphere of psychology and 
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psychiatry. "If understanding is inconclusive, then our predictions of what someone 
will do or how he will behave are equally so", (p 358). 
e) Although hermeneutic re-interpretability occurs, and all topics are open to it, it is 
possible to become more certain concerning specific understandings. "Multiplicity" of 
"unlimited possibilities of interpretation... does not necessarily imply haphazard 
uncertainty but can mean a flexible movement within the range of possibility that leads 
to an increasing certainty of vision", (Op cit). It follows that rationality exists and that 
some interpretations can be shown to be better or worse than others. Although there is 
re-interpretability, there is not chaos or a loss of distinguishable criteria for making 
distinctions. 
f) Jaspers believed that it is possible to distinguish between truth and falsity (p 359). 
For him, phenomenology is about "understanding which illuminates" and "makes us 
positively conscious of what is". The representation of the nature of the relationship is 
also borne out by being able to judge between different types of relations. 
Phenomenology for Jaspers meant "purely an empirical method of enquiry 
maintained solely by the fact of patients' communications... The object of study is 
non-existent for the senses and we can experience only a representation of it... 
Description demands the creation of systematic categories, as well as demonstration of 
relationships and orderly sequences on the one hand and of sporadic appearances, 
unheralded and unforeseen, on the other", (p 55, fn). What he meant was that he 
wanted phenomenology to be an empirical investigation of the full range of human 
experiences understood as intentional and meaningful, rather than chaotic. He 
acknowledged that the consciousness of the other does not appear, so that only 
conscious communication can be studied. For Jaspers, the scope of the approach for 
psychotherapy practice should be sufficient to spot regular, definitive patterns and be 
capable of including and accounting for novel, unique and idiosyncratic occurrences. 
The consequence for those who accept these tenets is to agree with Jaspers in 
concluding that personality is inconclusive in a hermeneutic sense. "Personality is 
always inconclusive and points on to something else", (p 431). "The quality of a man 
can never be stated with absolute certainty as to the future and, so far as the actual 
manifestation has gone, can only be fixed in retrospect by ignoring the play of chance 
and free decision. Personalities are never whole and conclusive. If they were, they 
would be without life and potentiality, one-sided and stultified, grown into an 
automaton", (p 434). "We cannot say whether the theoretical concepts of what may 
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underlie everything do approximate to what `really is' or to what `is properly there'. 
There is no valid theory of psyche, only a philosophy of existence", (p 551). This latter 
sentence seems to support the idea that the force of non-empirical stance is sufficient to 
be correct. Self-reflexively, to accept hermeneutics is to be aware of what interpretative 
strategy or preferences are being taken towards a specific situation in terms of making 
sense of it. 
The point of this presentation of the early work of Jaspers is to illustrate that 
the influence of Dilthey was at large in the German-speaking world of mental health 
before Heidegger. The work of Jaspers has a contemporary hermeneutic quality to it. 
Further comments below are based on the reading and an extensive literature 
search of the leading databases of psychological and psychotherapy literature including 
Ovid, Medline, SilverPlatter and PsycLIT. The comments are drawn from an 
analysis of the available books and papers given in abstract on the databases. It is not 
feasible to give a detailed analysis with respect to this literature due to a lack of space 
at this late stage. The following comments concern how phenomenological topics or 
their equivalents are broached in the natural therapy literature that is theoretical and 
empirical. 
The specific topic of a primordial lifeworld does not arise in the databases of 
the literature of course. The closest equivalents to this might be worldview, cultural 
consciousness or the social learning of assumptions about the cultural world. There are 
writers and researchers who use the natural science mindset and techniques to discuss 
social learning from an intersubjective and cognitive-behavioural perspective. And 
there are those writers who discuss themes similar to intersubjectivity under the 
heading of `systems theory' but the latter writers are using an electronic and 
mechanical metaphor as the basis of their approach. 
Another literature search using the word "empathy, " produced many items of 
quantitative and qualitative empirical research, but no comprehensive discussions of 
the theories concerning how empathy occurs. It can be concluded that just about all 
therapies have ignored hermeneutics with a handful of exceptions (Tuckett, 1994). The 
constitution of the sense of the other is completely ignored within mainstream 
psychology. The only places where it does arise are in theorising about object 
constitution and in ubiquitous but nebulous remarks that the therapeutic relationship 
and empathy are central topics. 
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There is the beginning of a philosophy of psychotherapy in the work of 
Grünbaum (1984), Edelson (1984) and Erwin (1997). Erwin has no account of the 
psychological world and writes in support of logic. 
In some quarters of the UK there is a rumour that Lacan was a 
phenomenologist, which is entirely untrue. Lacan knew Heidegger personally and 
translated his work. But what he took from Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty was an 
interest in language, which he developed in his own way (Roudinesco, 1990, p 299). 
Roudinesco comments that Lacan accepted a turn to language and so he was critical of 
phenomenology because he sided with structuralism at the time (p 300). Lacan (1977, 
p 193) comments on "schema L" which is stated as being about how speech unfurls 
four positions. The schema is given as aZ shape in one paper and as a figure of eight 
in another work by Lacan and Wilden (1981, p 107, p 267). Lacan seems to be saying 
that what therapists receive is the unconscious. Little is explained in the presentation of 
the schema and because it has directional arrows in Lacan and Wilden, it makes more 
sense to read it as a series of `causative' interactions. 
Other-*unconscious Subject (das Es) 
- 
an original trauma occurs 
unconscious Subject-*object - the trauma is held in the infant in its unconscious 
object-*ego -a paranoid and alienated sense of self arises for clients 
ego-*Other 
- 
transference in the therapeutic relationship is shown in speech, affect and 
behaviour. 
What Lacan, Boss and Atwood and Stolorow have in common is that they work 
to criticise the Freudian influence that reifies and decontextualises by focusing on `the 
individual'. Binswanger and Ellenberger could be mentioned but they have not added a 
great deal. 
The work of Owen has been towards establishing the genuine relation between 
Husserl's phenomenology (1992,1993,1998,1999a, 1999b) and Heidegger's (2000a, 
2000b), and between Husserl and scientific psychology (Owen and Morris, 1999). 
Plomin (et a12000) is a useful work that shows natural science at its full extent but 
meaning is not wholly determined by the material substrate of "heritability". 
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3.4 Against pseudo-phenomenology 
The contributions of Husserl and Heidegger can be compared as alternative versions of 
phenomenology. To do so is to set a limit on the core concerns of the discipline. But 
the work of some `phenomenological' psychologists and psychotherapists is far outside 
of the core to deserve the name phenomenological because it has too little in common 
with the original themes. Although Giorgio, Wertz, Ihde and Strauss have appropriated 
the word "phenomenology" it does not mean that any of them make a priori analyses of 
noesis-noema correlations or any such activity. This gives rise to "phenomenology" in 
the vulgar sense of it being a mere subjectivism or description of what exists. 
Humanistic psychology, existential-humanistic therapy, existential psychiatry and 
other schools have perpetrated this fault. -It is. a new psychologism that never 
understood the old a priori pure psychology. 
The size of the problem is much greater than there being some psychologists 
who have felt that they wanted to develop some of Husserl's ideas into an empirical 
practice. The fact is that because so few people know what Husserl wanted his readers 
to do that a whole school of faulty scholarship has arisen that uses the original name 
but does nothing that the term stands for. Clearly, these writers have not considered the 
original works in any serious way. Since The Philosophy ofArithmetic, Husserl argued 
that concepts should become more valid by attending to conscious experience and 
mental processes should be related to sensual and intellectual meanings. For Husserl, 
the unrefined data are conscious, and the refined data are a priori essences, ideas. 
Giorgio and colleagues have only focused on lived experience as represented 
descriptively and understood as a focus on object-senses. Accordingly, this pseudo- 
phenomenology omits entirely the requisite focus on attending to the manners in which 
consciousness attends to its objects and does nothing to further apriori theoretical 
research. Marbach (1988a) is probably the best short introduction to what Husserl 
thought theorising in psychology should be. Giorgi and company are quite happy for 
phenomenology to be a science and for philosophy to be removed from psychology. 
The position is a new psychologism and the opposite of what Husserl and Heidegger 
wanted. Heidegger showed how well he understood Husserl's desire to reform 
psychology in his first part of Draft B, in response to Husserl's first draft of the 
Encyclopaedia Britannica paper. Contra Wertz and Giorgio, their reading is not a 
matter of a new interpretation of Husserl or Merleau-Ponty but a refusal to use his 
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procedures of a priori, noetic and eidetic research before any empirical work. 
Phenomenology is not about description without understanding what attitude oneself is 
in when turning to the objects, in order to understand the relation to the objects and the 
work that consciousness does. 
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Appendix 4 
The natural psychological science evidence-base for individual therapy 
Aim: The type of natural psychological science that is explored below is the standard 
empirical sort that applies statistics and falsificationism in making its conclusions. Such a 
type of thinking is close to what Freud wanted psycho-analysis to become. The purpose 
of this Appendix is to take stock of what has been achieved in creating a consensually 
agreed natural evidence base about all kinds of individual psychotherapy. The aim is to 
ascertain if, and in what way, this evidence-base for individual psychotherapy is 
converging. The potential outcome would be defining in what way there is convergence 
about `effective' therapy. The outcome raises questions about a wholly quantitative 
means for clinical reasoning and evidence-based practice. No specific comments are 
made concerning the use of statistics and the reliability of the means of generating the 
findings in the five sources that are analysed. Rather, the aim is to promote discussion 
and reflection on issues concerning the focus of empirical research as a whole. A guiding 
assumption is that there is a role for client-centred, need-oriented, useable research which 
would help with in-session effectiveness and other practical concerns. 
The focus of the natural scientific approach is on randomised control trials and 
meta-analyses for justifying and providing psychological services and therapy. Generally, 
psychotherapy research considers quantitative evidence that show what sorts of therapy 
are curative. But this is only one example of what empirical research could be. Currently, 
psychotherapy research answers one major research question: 
Research question 1. How should therapists practice effectively with specific disorders? 
The analysis below is proposed as a self-reflexive step in finding out how far 
randomised control trial (RCT) research has got in answering research question 1. The 
paper compares the references for specific disorders for individual therapy, to find out 
how much commonality there is among 4he recommendations made. 
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The easiest form of comparison is to display the recommendations of the 
evidence bases in tables. Five major evidence bases are surveyed. The sources for the 
comparison are taken from Gabbard (1995), Roth and Fonagy (1996), Division XII of the 
American Psychological Association (Chambless et al 1998), Nathan and Gorman (1998) 
and the UK Department of Health (2001). Four of these five works are interrelated. The 
Nathan and Gorman book follows the Chambless et al work. The Department of Health 
recommendations are a development of the study by Roth and Fonagy on behalf of the 
National Health Service (NHS) Executive. 
Table 1 displays the recommendations of Gabbard and his team (1995) from the 
American Psychiatric Association's Task Force on effectiveness. The strength of this 
huge collaborative effort is that psychodynamic and cognitive behavioural therapies are 
given room. The Task Force was the first to publish and set down recommendations on 
what is recommended practice for psychological and psychopharmacological mental 
health treatments. The work has its worth in including details on good practice and it 
makes recommendations on how to provide services for eating disorders, for instance. 
Some details of the size of the research group are provided and RCT findings are listed 
alongside research that has had group sizes as small as n=5 with no control group. In 
criticism, it is not clear which studies are of the preferred RCT format. 
Table 2 portrays a seemingly authoritative work (Roth and Fonagy, 1996). But 
after scrutiny, some of the recommendations in the closing pages of the work are made 
without substantive evidence. Specific omissions of the evidence exist with respect to 
two claims. First, the authors claim that psychological education, motivational 
interviewing and interventions that focus on self-control and behavioural couples therapy 
were "proven" interventions for overcoming alcohol abuse (p 366). No references are 
made to this literature and a search of PsycLIT by this writer could find no references in 
the database. Secondly, the authors claim that cognitive therapy is proven to help 
schizophrenia but again references are not quoted. A search of PsycLIT by this writer 
revealed two Chinese language publications that do support this claim but they are not 
referenced in Roth and Fonagy's book. Therefore, it is not clear what evidence is being 
cited to support these recommendations made in the closing pages. Accordingly, it is not 
clear what evidence has been employed in making the concluding statements on 
effectiveness. 
Chambless provides a set of recommendations that almost entirely support the 
provision of cognitive behavioural therapy (et al, 1998, Table 3). Chambless and her 
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team, on behalf of the American Psychological Association, apportion the findings into 
gradations of the amount of proven and possible efficacy. But they do not make clear 
which papers are RCT findings. Furthermore, in presenting guiding conclusions, it is 
necessary to make critical remarks about the quality and suitability of research but this is 
not done to any great extent. This aim would have take up more space than has been 
allocated by Chambless and company. 
Nathan and Gorman's recommendations (1998, Table 4) are particularly 
interesting because they set a chapter on medication against a chapter on the 
psychological therapies for a specific disorder or type of disorders. Table 4 shows what 
these editors recommend and a particular focus is made on RCT research. Throughout 
the book, however, it is not immediately clear which papers follow the RCT standard as 
opposed to other `lesser' types of evidence. This book also provides some details of the 
group sizes but this attention to detail is not present for all the papers cited in it. 
Table 5 shows the recommendations for practising psychological therapies within 
the British National Health Service (Department of Health, 2001). The immediate 
drawback of this work is that although it does clearly show its preferences for RCT and 
meta-analyses of RCT work. It also makes clear the very low sample sizes that have been 
accepted. Given the influential nature of this document in the provision of individual 
psychotherapy in the UK, it seems odd to be guided by research with particularly small 
group sizes. Methodological evaluation could play a much greater role in psychotherapy 
research, but that topic falls outside of the scope of this Appendix. 
Comparison of the five tables shows there is little consensus about specific papers 
that indicate what is effective for a specific disorder. But of the 186 papers cited by the 
five evidence bases, 164 (88%) are either cognitive or behavioural, eight (4%) are 
psychodynamic and six (3%) are interpersonal. The remaining eight papers suggest 
relaxation skills, social skills, brief therapy and educative approaches. The most obvious 
conclusion is that the preferred modality of the scientist-practitioner model, natural 
science cognitive-behavioural therapy is the most researched type of practice. But other 
conclusions can be drawn from a perusal of the first five tables of findings. But the 
profession as a whole has no consensus and a telling rift appears between those who 
think there is no evidence to suggest the uptake of cognitive-behavioural treatment 
(Bolsover, 2002) and those who portray cognitive-behavioural therapy and its RCT 
format as the winner (Chambless and Ollendick, 2001). 
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A second conclusion can be drawn as follows. If each agreed conclusion is 
permitted to count as one entry in a catalogue that totals all contributions from tables one 
to five, then each `vote' that accrues indicates replicated support. Further totting up for 
each type of therapy for a disorder gives rise to Tables 6 and 7 below. The point is to 
gauge how the evidence base is converging and how a consensus is appearing concerning 
what are or are not acceptable forms of treatment for specific disorders. Table 6 includes 
some disorders that have no evidence base to suggest any form of treatment. The 
allocation of votes for entry into Table 6 was made in the following manner. If there are 
no results mentioned in the five sets of recommendations, a dash is entered in the table. If 
there is only one finding for therapies of different sorts, then "no consensus" is entered as 
a dash. If there are more than two different papers agreed by separate recommendations, 
then the amount of times the same paper is mentioned counts as a vote for entry into the 
table. Where the evidence base converges is where more than one recommendation has 
concluded that the same type of therapy for the same disorder is suitable. This gives rise 
to the following conclusions across the board. 
Psychological science by itself is insufficient in that its manner of 
conceptualising therapy as some form of effectiveness competition, entirely focus on 
what type of therapy is better than another one. It is a matter of interpretation as to what 
the votes of Table 6 mean. Perhaps, the cognitive-behavioural therapies contain within 
them principles that define good practice for all forms of individual therapy. It is possible 
to think about tendencies that appear between the lines of what has been shown effective. 
For instance, encouraging clients to be self-caring, to be informed about the principles of 
their therapy and to be active outside of the session are general principles that might 
make all forms of therapy more effective. Another possibility, within the results of Table 
6, is that clients may need to test themselves and their beliefs in their problematic 
situations. If this were accepted as a core theoretical principle for any therapy, it would 
mean that all forms of therapy might include some behavioural task-setting (exposure 
therapy) as part of the work. 
One question that comes to mind is to think about reasons why there has not been 
any clear convergence on specific papers among the five sets of recommendations above. 
If it were generally the case that a specific type of therapeutic approach was suitable for a 
specific disorder, then more than one researcher would replicate such a finding. But this 
is not the case. The only cases where there is agreement on what is effective, with respect 
to the type of disorder, are those in Table 6. 
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Disorder Consensually-agreed forms of therapy 
Substance abuse Behaviour 
- 
Higgins et at 1993, Drummond & Glautier 1994 
CBT & relapse prevention 
- 
Carroll et at 1994 
Social skills 
- 
McGrady et at 1986, Benton & Schroeder 1990, Mattick & Jarvis 1993 
Schizophrenia Social skills 
- 
Hogarty et at 1986, Eckman et at 1992, Marder et at 1996 
Supportive 
- 
Hogarty et at 1974, Gunderson et at 1984, 
Paranoid schizophrenia 
Major depression CBT 
- 
Elkin et at 1989, Thase et at 1991, Depression Guideline Panel 1993, Jacobson et at 1996 
Dysthymia Behaviour 
- 
McLean & Hakistan 1979, Bellack et at 1981,1983, Jacobson et at 1996 
Cognitive 
- 
Nezu 1986, Dobson 1989, Nezu & Perri 1989, Hollon et at 1991,1993, Mintz et at 
1992, Stravynski & Greenberg 1992, Gaffan et at 1995 
CBT 
- 
Robinson at at 1990, Makowitz 1996, 
Interpersonal 
- 
Elkin et at 1989,1995 
Bipolar 
- 
Cyclothymia 
- 
Agoraphobia Exposure 
- 
Munby & Johnston 1980, burns et at 1986, Jansson & Ost 1982, Jansson et at 1986, 
Ghosh et at 1988, Jacobson et at 1988, Trull et at 1988, Cox et at 1992, van Balkom 1997 
Panic Behaviour 
- 
Barlow et at 1989, Craske et at 1991, Clark et at 1994 
Cognitive 
- 
Sokol et at 1989, Beck et at 1992 
CBT 
- 
Clum 1989, Klosko et at 1990, Michelson & Marchione 1991, Salkovskis et at 1991 
Panic therapy 
- 
Jacobson et at 1988, Barlow et at 1989, Craske et at 1991, Clum et at 1993, 
Margraf et at 1993, Teich et at 1993, Gould 1995, Milrod & Busch 1996, van Balkom 1997 
Specific phobia Behaviour - Bandura et at 1969, Crowe et at 1972, Ost 1978, Kirsch et al 1983, Marshall 1985, 
1988, Ost et at 1991, Donohue et at 1994, Emmelkamp et at 1994, Heimberg & Juster 1995, 
Herbert 1995 
CBT 
- 
Ledwidge 1978, Heimberg 1990, Heimberg et at 1994 
Social phobia Behaviour - Paul & Shannon 1966, Paul 1967a, Woy & Efran 1972, Ost et at 1981, Wlazlo et at 
1990, Feske & Chambless 1995 
Cognitive 
- 
Hope 1990, Chambless & Gillis 1993, 
CBT 
- 
Scholing & Emmelkamp 1993, Taylor 1996 
Social skills 
- 
Bandura 1971,1977, Mersh et at 1991 
Obsessive compulsive Exposure & relapse prevention - Solyom & Sookman 1977, Marks et at 1980, Christensen et at 
1987, van Balkom et at 1994, Steketee & Shapiro 1995 
CBT & relapse prevention 
- 
Abramowitz 1996,1997, Cox et at, van Balkom et at 1994 
Cognitive 
- 
Emmelkamp & Beens 1991, O'Sullivan et at 1991, van Oppen et at 1995 
PTSD Behaviour 
- 
Brom et at 1989, Cooper & Clum 1989, Keane et at 1989, Boudewyns & llyer 
1990, Foa et at 1989,1991 
CBT 
- 
Resick et at 1988, Cooper & Clum 1989, Keane et at 1989, Boudewyns & layer 1990, 
Resick & Schnike 1992 
Stress inoculation & EMDR 
- 
Shalev et at 1996, Solomon et at 1992 
Generalised anxiety Behaviour 
- 
Butler et at 1991 
CBT 
- 
Borkovec et at 1987, Durham & Turvey 1987, Power et at 1990, Butler et at 1991, 
Barlow at at 1992, Gould et at 1997 
Relaxation skills 
- 
Barlow et at 1992, Borkovec et at 1987, Borkovec & Costello 1993 
Dissociative identity 
Sexual aversion 
Anorexia CBT & dietary management 
- 
Chanon et at 1989, Treasure et at 1995 
Bulimia CBT 
- 
Freeman et at 1988, Mitchell et at 1990,1993, Fairburn et at 1993, Wilson & Fairbum 
1993, Agras et at 1989,1992, Thackwray et at 1993, Mitchell et at 1996, Lewandowski eta! 
1997 
Interpersonal 
- 
Fairburn et at 1993, Wilfley et at 1993 
Table 6- The consensually agreed results for axis l disorders between Tables I to 5. 
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A second question that comes to mind is the difference between the quantitative 
research model and the other types of research that are not given preference. The 
measurable and the meaningful are not mutually exclusive but there is a great deal of 
difference between the contingency of any set of research clients and the population as a 
whole. Accordingly, a note must be made of the approved types of methodology and 
evidence that are currently acceptable and should inform the drive towards clinical 
governance, evidence-based practice and clinical reasoning. Although the wording differs 
among Nathan and Gorman (1998) and the UK Department of Health (2001), there is 
agreement that there are a small number of types of evidence that occur in decreasing 
importance: 
Type I evidence 
- 
at least one good systematic review, including at least 
one randomised controlled trial 
II 
- 
at least one good randomised controlled trial 
III 
- 
at least one well designed intervention study without randomisation 
IV 
- 
at least one well designed observational study 
V- expert opinion, including the opinion of service users and carers. 
Department of Health 1999b, p 6. 
The way to deliver services that meet clients' needs is more complex than finding out 
what the outcome results are on average. For natural psychological science, the evidence 
base is the major means for designing the overall delivery of a service according to the 
guidance of clinical governance, a new form of management by objectives (Department 
of Health, 1995,1999a, 1999b, 1999c, Parry and Richardson, 1996). One previous 
findings in this area was that all therapies were equally effective in providing help 
(Beutler, 1991). 
In consideration of the type of research that is given preference throughout, it 
should not go without comment that there is an obvious preference for quantificatory 
approaches over qualitative ones. Clearly, the RCT model is narrowly focused on making 
comparisons of effectiveness gained under controlled circumstances. In practice, 
therapists are much more able to be flexible, motivate and meet clients' specific needs as 
they arise in sessions. Accordingly, there is a difference between effectiveness (what 
happens in real sessions) and efficacy (what happens in RCT research). The real situation 
is further influenced in an uncontrolled manner because clients have different 
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motivations to work and different abilities to be psychologically minded. Plus there is the 
factor of understanding co-morbidity of multiple disorders and personality factors, rather 
than the `pure' presentations of a disorder in the RCT case. The crucial point is then to 
assess and differentiate between false and genuine solutions to problems concerning 
effectiveness. The interpretation of RCT findings as indicating what has efficacy does not 
account for the skilfulness and the ad hoc ability to create a therapeutic outcome with a 
client. Accordingly, if there were more of a focus on relationship factors, for instance, it 
would be possible to differentiate between helpful and hindering types of relating to 
clients. But this could only be achieved through qualitative means. Indeed, as 
effectiveness is the aim of empirical research, it would seem necessary at some point to 
temper the zeal to know outcome effect size, in preference for knowing more about 
relationship and motivational factors whereby clients can be enabled to participate in 
their therapy more easily. But it is still the case that clinical governance, clinical 
reasoning and assessment can be furthered by reading in-between the lines of 
standardised quantitative findings and by adding useful qualitative data concerning how 
well clients can differently use what opportunities are offered them. 
Substantial criticisms of the natural psychological model have been asserted by 
some of its own practitioners who have become dissatisfied with what it studies and how 
it studies it (Shapiro and Elliott, 1986, Stiles and Shapiro, 1989, Stiles et al, 1995). 
Another reading of the five tables presented above is to consider that other 
uncontrolled variables are at play. Standardisation is missing within the appliance of 
science in the creation of an evidence base for practice, funding and research. A future 
aim might be to standardise further the use of statistics, randomised control trials and 
meta-analyses. 
Furthermore, there are substantial differences in the quality of the natural science 
of statistics and methodology in psychotherapy. There are fundamental differences in the 
quality of evidence that is used for justification and important decision-making in clinical 
reasoning and service delivery. The types of evidence mentioned above are used in 
ascertaining the reliability of any recommendations in quantitative thinking. But just 
because in RCT research, a number of therapeutic approaches to a specific disorder may 
not have been researched, it does not mean that those approaches should be discontinued. 
Just because a single RCT study has occurred it does not mean that a specific form of 
therapeutic orientation is a treatment of choice. Several writers have warned that just 
because a specific brand name of therapy has been researched, it should not be concluded 
9o 
that it is the only suitable form of therapy for a specific disorder. What this shows is the 
interrelation of problems and the belief system adopted in regarding the data. The 
hermeneutic problems of the natural approach can further teased out: 
Initial observation: The excellent organisation of cognitive behavioural therapists and 
empirical researchers is worthy of applause. The best-organised social systems win as 
they can create acceptable evidence and perform well according to their own standards. 
But RCT research is only focused on finding what are effective therapies from the 
standpoint of what is most effective of change on an averaged-out basis, where large 
numbers of participants and persons in the control group are required. In reality, there 
are no pure disorders and no pure therapies (Owen, 1999b). 
Problem 1: There is poor science at large amongst natural researchers into therapy 
(Cohen, Sargent and Sechrest, 1986, Morrow-Bradley and Elliott, 1986, Dar, Serlin 
and Omer, 1994). Time and again, these researchers break their own rules. 
Problem 2: There is no place for hermeneutics within natural research currently. For 
instance, is there chaos or order within the results? A natural researcher is not qualified 
to answer to this question. On the contrary to natural science, it is the place of 
hermeneutics to interpret results and weigh up meanings and emphases. There are no 
standard forms of meta-analysis, providing systematic reviews and no standardisation 
in creating RCTs. 
Problem 3: Natural research questions and answers do not fit the nature of human 
being nor psychotherapy. Their approach is not acceptable. There is a further distance 
between RCT research and research into therapeutic process where the latter can only 
be investigated through a different type of question and answer. Accordingly, RCT 
findings are not focused on meaning and process, so cannot answer the more detailed 
questions that practitioners would like to know. 
Problem 4: There is no consensus on what constitutes the appraisal of statistics and 
interpreting the findings of natural research (Holmes, 2002, Williams, 2002). 
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Therefore, what is `proven' to natural researchers is that there is an evidence- 
producing capability. 
The meaning-oriented and qualitative-research methods are not valued, and 
because they are not well organised, they are not able to argue their case. 
One solution is to pose answerable research questions and use methods that 
temper the non-meaning and non-process emphasis, to pose questions that are worth 
knowing. 
It could become possible to be rigorous about therapeutic process, relating and 
meaning, and so meet clients' needs. 
At this stage in the quality control of research, without scrutinising each paper's 
methodology it is not possible to find out if the specific studies cited in the tables above 
have any genuine claim to statistical or methodological validity. For instance, the 
minimum sample size varies with the type of analysis being carried out. If the study uses 
an analysis of variants, the minimum meaningful sample size is 20. If a correlation study 
is carried out, the minimum is 30. If a factor analytic study of 10 questions were the tool, 
then more than 100 persons would be required in the therapy group. If there were 30 
questions, then at least a thousand participants would be required. Furthermore, the 
protocol of meta-analysis has been heavily criticised by Erwin who finds it unacceptable 
to dilute the worth of methodologically sound experiments with those that are less sound. 
"There is no argument, or at least none that I am aware of, that demonstrates that any one 
of these methods is correct and that the others are all incorrect, " Erwin concludes in 
assaying the logical consistency involved in meta-analysis (1984, p 435). What the 
references mentioned above do not include is any adherence to standardised forms of 
statistical testing. The upshot is that like is not being compared to like. Hence, the 
recommendations of the quantitative evidence base remain disparate attempts that do not 
support the aims of psychotherapy research. Following Tables 6 and 7, it is here argued 
that the quantitative enterprise does not comprise an authoritative set of findings. 
Accordingly, as the quality of the science used is dubious and not standardised, the 
recommendations cannot be accepted as justification for practice or service provision. 
The question that appears for this Appendix is to ask why quantitative research 
has such a dominance in an area that is notoriously personal, subjective and is potentially 
resistant to clarity of thought. Again, it is argued that an attention to the perceptions and 
misperceptions their clients may have about how they are being helped, for instance, that 
may tend toward them dropping out of therapy, rather than seeing it through to a positive 
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conclusion. There is a question raised concerning the suitability of Paul's early 
formulation of outcome research as: "What treatment, by whom, is most effective for this 
individual, with that specific problem, and under which set of circumstances, " (1967b, p 
111). Rather than accept this scientist-practitioner model of thought, it is perhaps up to 
researchers to be more precise about what goes into the search prior to any re-search: 
that if it is assumed that quantitative questions are the most apt type of question then it is 
no wonder that there is an omission of details concerning the process of therapy of 
different sorts. Stated in a different way, perhaps it is the role of RCT research to make 
one type of contribution that needs to be aided by contributions from qualitative, 
theoretical and service-provision perspectives. 
There are pertinent questions concerning clients' abilities to use what is offered 
them, for instance. The purpose of research is to inform therapy practice and structure the 
services provided. One way of making demarcations is to separate services, perhaps in 
the following way. There can be: 
a) Long-term therapists who only deal with the most severe forms of disability. Even 
these services may need to exclude persons who cannot use or benefit from psychological 
therapy. It would be interesting to know what factors make people unsuitable for any 
type of psychological help. 
b) Medium-term therapists who specialise in working with medium disability. Some 
people will have to be referred to long-term or short-term work, so it is necessary to 
estimate how well they will be able to use what is offered them. Some will have to be re- 
referred when a new episode of distress ensues, so it is useful to know how to manage 
their therapies across the lifespan. 
c) Short-term therapists in primary care who specialise in sets of techniques that help 
minor disability. Yet this type of help has limits and so it is necessary to know how it fits 
with a and b. 
Qualitative research could orient itself more to the factors concerning how to 
place clients with widely different needs into different parts of the mental health services. 
What the discussion above shows is that there is a need for research about the 
pragmatic concerns that face therapists. Specifically, it is not just a question of research 
question 1, "how should therapists practice effectively with specific disorders? " But it is 
necessary to consider how clients appear with novel patterns of need, ability and personal 
history. There is a `research question'-posed in assessment and answered by referral. 
Justifications of the assessment protocol and the clinical reasoning that accompanies are 
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required. 
The quantitative research whole, of all relevant RCT and meta-analytic findings, 
would take a great deal of diligent comparison to scrutinise their methodological quality. 
Yet, it is most necessary to standardise rules for RCT and meta-analytic formats. At some 
point in the future, it may be possible to evaluate the types of statistics used along with 
the sample sizes. The agreement of standards for statistics and methodology would 
formalize quantitative work and render it more cohesive. It is time for the creation of 
some guidelines for the future quality control of psychotherapy research and an appraisal 
of the strengths and weaknesses of research methodologies of various sorts. 
In addition to the research question at the head of the section, there are self- 
reflexive and self-regulatory components of research, its self-understanding. With the 
preference on quantitative methodology, it is not clear to what extent qualitative research 
can contribute to the aims of answering research question 1. Secondly, at the time of 
assessment, findings concerning effectiveness are used to answer a second practical 
question about where clients should be placed between primary, secondary and tertiary 
services. These questions concern where to place potential clients according to the 
amount of previous help they have received and estimates of their severity of disability 
and ability to use what is offered them. The questions are: 
Research Question 2 How should the services and access to them be structured? This 
question could be answered according to some estimate of the severity of disability, 
distress and co-morbidity of the occurrence of axis I and II disorders. 
RQ3 How qualitative research into therapeutic processes and relapse prevention are 
given a clear remit with respect to quantitative effectiveness research. 
RQ4 How can clients best use which types of therapy? In addition, for what optimum 
length of time? The question concerns how best to place a client within a range of 
different services that are on offer. 
RQ5 How can research findings be used to inform the therapy profession concerning 
how the troubled mind works and be interpreted to show how therapy helps in different 
forms of distress. 
But this short list is not the full quota of possibilities. What practitioners want to 
know are general strategies from research findings of all sorts and this type of question is 
an interpretative and value-oriented question. There are degrees of disability, suffering, 
complexity of co-morbidity, attachment history and different abilities to use therapies of 
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different sorts. Further consensus on the qualities of clients who might benefit most from 
specific theoretical orientations and individual, group, couples or family forms of 
therapy, would be helpful. A sole emphasis on effectiveness has not produced a sufficient 
amount of evidence for approaches other than cognitive and behavioural treatments. 
Perhaps the guiding research question of Paul needs to be recast. It could become: "What 
principles of treatment, for which client needs is most effective for this individual's 
ability to participate in what type of therapy in which set of circumstances? " 
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